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RÉSUMÉ 
Il y a plusieurs écoles d'interprétation concernant la nature du scepticisme de David 
Hume. Ces interprétations caractérisent les arguments sceptiques de Hume comme 
étant soit: i) seulement partie d'un projet naturaliste de ce que Hume appelle "la 
science de la nature humaine"; ii) d'une portée radicale et destructrice des 
hypothèses métaphysiques et rationalistes; iii) la seule forme "compatible" de 
scepticisme pyrrhonien; iv) une forme de scepticisme mitigé. Ce document présente 
une nouvelle approche pour renforcer l'interprétation selon laquelle le scepticisme de 
Hume est de type modéré. On explore la conception et les soins répandus contre la 
mélancolie au dix-huitième siècle. Grâce à cette approche, on peut faire une nouvelle 
lecture de la façon dont Hume représente la mélancolie sceptique dans son Traité de 
la Nature Humaine. Hume montre que la stabilité doxastique (un équilibre entre 
croyances en conflit) peut être atteinte grâce au contraste entre deux passions: 
l'amour pour la vérité et la mélancolie. Les conclusions du travail de recherche 
montrent que la solution humienne à la mélancolie sceptique passe par le rejet 
seulement temporaire de la pensée complexe et de l'enquête rationnelle. Une telle 
approche est conforme au type de soins prescrits contre la mélancolie dans le dix-
huitième siècle, lesquels ordonnent la modération dans les activités intellectuelles 
pour éviter l'abattement émotionnel. Par ailleurs, on montre que, grâce à leurs 
avantages pratiques et épistémiques, les traits de personnalité permettant le 
scepticisme modéré dans les conditions appropriées sont désirables. 
MOTS-CLÉS : histoire, épistémologie, scepticisme, mélancolie, émotions. 
ABSTRACT 
There are severa! schools of interpretation regarding the nature of David Hume's 
scepticism. These different approaches claim that Hume's sceptical arguments either: 
i) only foster a naturalistic project or what Hume caUs a "science of human nature"; 
ii) aim at destroying metaphysical and rationalistic assumptions; iii) offer the only 
"consistent" form of Pyrrhonian scepticism; iv) form part of a kind of mitigated 
scepticism. This thesis offers new evidence to reinforce the interpretation that 
Hume's scepticism is of a moderate nature. My analysis explores the conception and 
treatment of melancholy prevailing in eighteenth-century England, which allows for 
a new reading of Hume's portrayal of sceptical melancholy in his Treatise of Human 
Nature. Hume shows that doxastic stability-an equilibrium between conflicting 
beliefs-is reached through finding an equilibrium between two passions: love of 
truth and melancholy. My findings reveal that Hume's solution to sceptical 
melancholy consists oftemporarily rejecting abstruse reasoning and rational inquiry. 
This approach is in line with the eighteenth century's treatment ofmelancholy, which 
prescribes moderation in intellectual endeavours in order to avoid despondency. 
Moreover, the character traits allowing moderate scepticism, developed under the 
appropriate circumstances, are portrayed as desirable because of their practical and 
epistemic advantages. 
KEYWORDS: history, epistemology, scepticism, melancholy, emotions. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I aim at pro vi ding further support for the daim that the nature of David 
Hume's (1711-1776) philosophical doubt is that of a moderate sceptic. I intend to 
reach this goal by showing that, for Hume, the love of truth and melancholy are two 
passions that can pull one's point of view in two opposing directions, resulting in 
doxastic stability1-an equilibrium between conflicting beliefs. The tension between 
these two passions involves a tension between conflicting beliefs because Hume 
associates the love of truth with the pursuit of knowledge through the use of reason, 
while linking melancholy with a loss of hope in attaining knowledge. 
Although Hume describes the love oftruth extensively (T 2.3.10.1-12, SBN pp. 448-
454), he writes little about melancholy. However, since melancholy plays such a 
fundamental role in Hume's account of scepticism, I will explore it here, both 
historically and philosophically, in order to better understand the role it plays in 
Hume's Treatise. In addition, to better understand how the love of truth triggers 
melancholy, I will dosely examine the chief sources that shape the conception of 
melancholy in the eighteenth century. The literature under review offers important 
insights. 
Until sorne decades ago, most secondary literature has overlooked the link between 
Hume's epistemology and the passions in general,2 as well as the link between 
melancholy and the love of truth in particular. I daim that these neglected aspects of 
Hume's philosophy are indicative of the nature of his scepticism. Considering them 
more seriously can shed light on the current debate regarding the nature of Hume's 
scepticism. 
1 The concept of doxastic stability was borrowed from Louis Loeb's (2002) study of the role that 
2 After Ardal ( 1966) and Bai er ( 1991 ), there are many scholars paying attention to this lin k. 
2 
There is no doubt that Hume considers melancholy as a passion since he explicitly 
classifies it as such in a passage of Book II of his Treatise-a book entitled "Of the 
Passions"-in the following way: "Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth 
and melancholy; all these passions 1 feel more from communication than from my 
own natural temper and disposition" (T 2.1.11.2, SBN pp. 316-317). Concerning the 
love of truth, it is also clear that Hume considers it a passion, as he dedicates the last 
subsection of Book II of his Treatise to this subject (T 2.3 .1 0.1-12, SBN pp. 448-
454). 
There are currently four schools of thought discussing the nature of Hume's 
scepticism, namely: 
i) Sorne commentators (Baier, 1991; Garrett, 1997; Kemp Smith, 1905a, 1905b, 
1941 ; Stroud, 1981) be lieve that Hume uses sceptical arguments only to foster a 
positive and naturalistic project or what he calls a "science of human nature"-a 
methodical approach and study of human nature. 
ii) Other authors (Beattie, [1783] 1970; Kant, [1783] 2004; Reid, [1764/1785/1788] 
1983; Waxman, 2003) portray Hume as a radical sceptic. They support a long-
standing interpretation of Hume as a negative philosopher and destroyer of 
metaphysical and rationalistic assumptions. 
iii) There are also those, like Richard Pop kin ( 1951 ), for whom Hume offers the only 
"consistent" form of Pyrrhonian scepticism. According to Popkin, Hume's position is 
similar to that of Pyrrhonian sceptics, in that he appropriately distinguishes 
philosophical doubt from beliefs rooted in natural or psychological experiences. In 
connection with this interpretation, Donald Baxter (2008) explores how Hume's 
metaphysical principles and speculations are not inconsistent with his own 
scepticism. 
3 
iv) Finally, there are those who support the idea of Hume being a mitigated sceptic 
(Broughton, 2008; Castiglione, 2006; Fogelin, 1985, 2009; Meeker, 1998; Norton, 
1982, 1994; Penelhum, 2003; Strawson, 1985). These authors argue that Hume's 
epistemology is clearly sceptical with regards to reason, but that the workings of 
human nature help one make sense of the world. My argument is most closely 
aligned with this approach. However, my approach is different, since 1 shall 
substantiate this interpretation by paying attention to the connection between Hume' s 
scepticism and his views on the love of truth and melancholy, an important aspect of 
the problem which has been neglected in the on-going debate regarding the nature of 
Hume's scepticism. 
Moreover, a new understanding of the nature of Hume' s scepticism can be achieved 
by exploring Hume's account of sceptical melancholy vis-à-vis the eighteenth 
century conception of melancholy. Hume's Treatise-section 1.4.7 in particular 
(SBN pp. 263-274)---shows that the solution to live through an emotional crisis 
triggered by philosophical doubt has important parallels with the remedies prescribed 
against melancholy in the eighteenth century. Sorne of the themes that connect 
Hume's account ofsceptical melancholy and the conception ofmelancholy portrayed 
in the primary sources explored in this thesis are: solitude, physical inactivity, 
unfounded fears, excessive and abstruse thinking, inadequacy between self and 
world, incapacity to act, and despondency as a source of intellectual progress. 
This thesis gives a prominent place to the love of truth and melancholy in Hume's 
Treatise. 3 By acknowledging the love of truth as a trigger for scepticism, this work 
3 The main philosophical source of this thesis is Hume's Treatise. A disadvantage of this choice is 
the fact that many of Hume's writings after the publication of the Treatise offer evidence of certain 
modifications and refinements in his philosophy, which are not taken into consideration. Moreover, 
Hume himself writes in his "Advertisement," which was first published in the posthumous 1777 
edition of EHU, to disregard the Treatise as an unsuccessful, juvenile and unpolished work. In 
contrast with such a statement, sorne Hume scholars believe that, although Hume is discontented with 
both the reception of his Treatise and how it expresses his philosophy, he never deserts the 
fundarnental principles contained in it (Norton, 2000, p. 19). 
4 
explores the psychological mechanism that leads to melancholy and how one 
manages to live through it. In this new reading, 1 argue that melancholy constitutes 
an important and genuine aspect of Hume's work, a fact that is not sufficiently 
stressed in the vast majority of secondary literature.4 
Most commentators disregard the link between Hume' s conception of belief and the 
emotional aspects of his scepticism. Such a neglect becomes evident if one considers 
that most of the secondary literature focuses mainly on either one or the other of the 
three themes in Hume's Treatise-the study of the understanding, the passions, and 
morals-without drawing any deep connections between them. 5 Such division of 
labour has a considerable effect in limiting our understanding of the nature and scope 
ofHume's scepticism. 
This thesis comprises two chapters. Chapter 1 offers a survey of the history of the 
concept of melancholy-its aetiology, symptoms, and treatment. It also explores the 
persons, medical works, and cultural influences that shape its conception, from its 
historical origins in ancient Greece up to eighteenth-century England. This 
conceptual exploration starts with a close reading of Hume's Letter to a physician. 
Chapter Il explores the psychological process that, according to Hume, may plunge 
one into despondency. It also describes my interpretation of Hume's remedy against 
sceptical melancholy. Particular attention is paid to Hume's account of a sceptical 
crisis (T 1.4.7.1-15, SBN pp. 263-274), vis-à-vis the conception of melancholy 
explored in the first chapter, as well as an exploration of the role played by the love 
4 Sorne exceptions to this trend can be found in Baier (1991) and Guimarâes (2003, 2008). 
5 A remarkable exception can be found in the work of Annette Bai er ( 1991 }, who claims that in 
order to properly understand Hume's Treatise it is necessary to read it as a coherent and deeply 
connected work. She also argues that the Treatise 's strength grows and develops as one advances into 
its reading from Book 1 to Book III. 
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of truth. In addition, Chapter II concludes with a discussion of the role and moral 
advantages of the character traits that motivate moderate scepticism. 
CHAPTERI 
MELANCHOL Y IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 
Melancholy is a physical and mental condition consisting of a state of profound, 
pensive and long-lasting sadness, as well as unfounded fears. Currently, one would 
be inclined to classify such a condition as depression, but this would be misleading. 
The concept of melancholy is elusive and several modem scholars have tried to fix 
its definition with little success. Moreover, melancholy has often been a term equated 
with unhappiness, hypochondria, spleen, vapours, madness and other mental 
disorders.6 This chapter explores how this ailment is thought of, from its conceptual 
origins up until Hume's time. 
After offering a summary of Hume's Letter to a physician, 1 will show how what 
Hume says in this letter relates to a long history of conceptions of melancholy-from 
the views of ancient Greek medicine to those of eminent physicians a few decades 
before Hume's time. 1 will especially focus on the specifie conceptions of 
melancholy in eighteenth-century England. 
6 Clark Lawlor observes that, in the eighteenth century, "[m]elancholy, hypochondria, spleen, and 
vapours were ali terms for what we now cali depression, and ali could be as vague (or as specifie) as 
our present variety of definitions and explanations" (2012, p. 5). According to Jennifer Radden, during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the terms "spleen" and "hypochondriasis" were sometimes 
used as equivalents (2000, p. 174). Stanley Jackson shows that the boundaries between different 
terms defining mental illness, such as "hypochondriasis," "the spleen," and "melancholy" are, to say 
the !east, fuzzy. He also notes that, in the eighteenth century, the term "melancholy" had severa! 
meanings: "[O]ften to vaguer forms of malaise, often to just plain unhappiness, but unfortunately and 
sometimes confusingly, it was also still used to refer to the traditional disease ofmelancholia, a form 
of madness" (1986, p. 140). Sorne eighteenth century scholars were also aware of this problem. For 
instance, George Cheyne writes: "The Spleen or Vapours, as the Word is used in England, is of so 
general and loose a Signification, that it is a common Subterfuge for meer Ignorance of the Nature of 
Distempers. Ali Lowness of Spirits, Swelling of the Stomach, frequent Eructation, Noise in the Bowels 
or Ears, frequent Yawning, Inappetency, Restlesness, Inquietude, Fidgeting, Anxiety, Peevishness, 
Discontent, Melancholy, Grief, Vexation, Ill-Humour, Inconstancy, /ethargick or watchful Disorders, 
in short, every Symptom, not already classed under sorne particular limited Distemper, is called by the 
general Name of Spleen and Vapours: ofwhich there are various and different Symptoms, according 
to the different Constitutions, Tempers of Mind, and common Diseases, Persons subject to such 
Symptoms labour un der" ( 1733, p. 194 ). 
'-------------------------
7 
Although there is no evidence of Hume's direct acquaintance with the primary 
sources explored in this chapter, it is reasonable to think that they shaped the 
eighteenth-century understanding of melancholy, and that Hume's comprehension of 
melancholy was thus influenced by such system ofbeliefs. 
1.1 Hume's Letter to a physician 
At the age of twenty-three, Hume wrote a letter to an anonymous Scottish physician 
and scholar. It is uncertain who the intended recipient of this letter was and whether 
the letter was actually sent. According to Hume's nineteenth century biographer, the 
recipient of Hume's letter was probably George Cheyne, whose writing in The 
English Malady resembles the tone of Hume's letter and who was a Scotsman and a 
prominent physician who "bestowed sorne attention on mental philosophy" (Hill 
Burton, 1846, pp. 42-47). But Hume's twentieth century biographer, Ernest Mossner, 
disagrees with this hypothesis. Mossner argues that Cheyne was no longer practicing 
medicine in London when the letter was written and that Cheyne would have been 
offended by the comments that Hume makes in his letter about philosophy and 
religion. Moreover, he claims the letter was probably written to John Arbuthnot, "an 
excellent physician, a man of deep learning, and a man of much humour" (Mossner, 
1944; 1980, p. 84). However, another author claims that the intended recipient wasn't 
Arbuthnot, but most probably Cheyne (Wright, 2003). This conclusion is based on 
material found in Cheyne's relatively recent intellectual biography (Guerrini, 2000). 
In this letter, Hume provides an account of the way his health deteriorated during the 
previous five years and asks for medical advice conceming his despondent state. 
This document reveals Hume's early curiosity and inclination for intellectual 
endeavours. He mentions that, after considerable study of numerous unresolved 
8 
philosophical disputes, he feels inclined to seek a new way to establish truth (Letter 
to a physician, pp. 12-13). 
He recounts how, by the age of eighteen, he is carried away by a "new Scene of 
Thought,"7 which transports him "beyond Measure," and makes him abandon any 
other pleasure or business, including his plans to study law, and focus all of his 
efforts on becoming a scholar and philosopher (Letter to a physician, pp. 12-13 ). 
He mentions that after sorne months of arduous study, his enthusiasm for intellectual 
work wanes. Thinking that his "coldness" towards study is due to laziness, he 
doubles his intellectual efforts during the following nine months. Although he feels 
uneasy, his condition does not worsen. He tries to strengthen his composure and 
understanding by reading texts about morality and virtue by Cicero, Seneca, and 
Plutarch. But, the solitude of his studious life makes these efforts pointless since he 
cannot put into practice, against the more tangible misfortunes of life, his reflections 
about death, poverty, shame, and pain. By the time he realizes this situation, he has 
already ruined his health (Letter to a physician, p. 14). 
The first physical symptom that Hume describes is "[s]curvy [s]pots" on his fmgers, 
and this symptom is successfully treated by a physician who also warns him about 
the " [v ]apors." This is ad vice that Hume initially dismisses. By the age of nineteen 
he notices a new symptom, that of "[p ]tyalism or [ w ]ateryness in the mouth." After 
consulting with his physician, he is diagnosed with the so-called "Disease of the 
Learned," a form of melancholy affecting scholars. Hume has difficulty accepting 
this diagnosis since he daims not to experience any "lowness of [s]pirit," a typical 
symptom of those suffering from the "Disease of the Learned." 
7 Unless otherwise stated, ali references in this section are to Hume's Letter to a physician. 
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For the next seven months, Hume follows his doctor's advice by going under a 
course of "[b]itters, & [a]nti-hysteric [p]ills," drinking "an English [p]int of [c]laret 
[w]ine every [d]ay," and riding "8 or 10 Scotch [m]iles." Acknowledging at last that 
he suffers from the "Disease of the Leamed" helps him ease his worry that the 
"[c]oldness" experienced towards his studies might be due to a defect in his nature or 
genius. Hume is eager to continue his philosophical endeavours and the prospect that 
his intelligence is not permanently damaged gives him considerable hope (Letter to a 
physician, p. 14). 
Hume then becomes more moderate in his studies, applying his intellect only when 
he feels like it. Such moderation helps in the recovery of his "[s]pirits" and in the 
progress of his work. He is constant in his diet and daily habits, riding two or three 
times a week and walking every day. But, in spite of these measures, his condition 
does not completely improve. He develops new symptoms, such as "a ravenous 
[a]ppetite," which makes him become "the most sturdy, robust, healthful-like 
[t]ellow you have seen." He also mentions the milder symptoms of "[p]alpitation of 
the heart," and "[w]ind in[ ... his] [s]tomach." Y et, again, he denies experiencing any 
"lowness of [s]pirits." The partial recovery encourages him to continue riding almost 
every day, except during the winter (Le tt er to a physician, p. 15). 
Hume discovers that the problem with the moral philosophy of antiquity is that it 
depends more on the invention of virtue and happiness than the experience of human 
nature. Upon this realization, he decides to focus on the study of human nature in 
order to find the truth about morality (Letter to a physician, p. 16). But, the 
symptoms of Hume's disease persist and he has difficulty concentrating without 
continuai interruptions. He nevertheless keeps working and produces a considerable 
amount of philosophical writing, which he struggles to bring to a consistent whole. 
In spite of his symptoms, Hume stresses that he suffers from a "weakness" rather 
than a "[l ]owness of [ s ]pirits." He distinguishes the severity of his " [ d]istemper" from 
10 
"common [v ]apors," comparing the difference to the distinction between " [v ]apors" 
and "[m]adness." 
Hume further suggests that his symptoms are similar to the " [ c ]oldness & [ d]esertion 
of the [ s ]pirit" described in the writings of the French mystics and local religious 
fanatics. By using such anal ogy, Hume implies that the force of passion and intensity 
he experiences during his deep and abstruse thinking discomposes "the [f]abric of the 
[n]erves & [b]rain, as muchas profound [r]eflections, & that warmth or [e]nthusiasm 
which is inseparable from them," thus leaving his spirit cold and empty (Letter to a 
physician, p. 17). 
The recognition that his philosophical studies would not help improve his condition, 
the encouragement brought on by partial relief from his symptoms, and the advice of 
his physicians help him realize two things that worsen his condition: " [ s ]tudy & 
[i]dleness." Correspondingly, he discovers two effective remedies: "[b]usiness & 
[d]iversion." Realizing that he has been devoting most of his time to study and very 
little to business and distractions, he resolves to take distance from his studies by 
seeking a more active life and transitorily becoming a merchant (Letter to a 
physician, pp. 17-18). 
Hume's Letter to a physician shows a genuine longing for reassurance that his 
prospects for a full recovery from distemper are good because he is eager to resume 
his philosophical project with the initial passion that he had before the onset of the 
first symptoms. The letter also reveals many interesting aspects about how the severe 
habits of a studious life can wreck the physical and mental health of the philosopher. 
As it will be shown later on, other important insights about philosophical melancholy 
are present in Hume's Treatise. But, in order to better understand Hume's account of 
melancholy, a doser look needs to be given to the theoretical background of 
melancholy in the eighteenth century. The following section provides an overview of 
11 
how medical beliefs shaped the understanding of melancholy from its ancient Greek 
origins to Hume's time. 
1.2 Historical background 
1.2.1 Ancient Greek origins 
Since at least the fourth century BCE, the Greeks identified melancholy as a physical 
and psychological distress. Hippocrates (c. 460-377 BCE) believed that four basic 
bodily liquids or humours (blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm) influence the 
temperament of a person according to the proportion in which they are found in his 
body. He understood melancholy as an ex cess of black bile, which causes, among 
other symptoms, a pessimistic outlook on life. For Hippocrates, causes of 
melancholy are believed to be a natural disposition, a psychological shock, or 
excessive and prolonged work. Gal en ( c. 129-199) continued with this tradition and 
insisted on the psychosomatic and hypochondriac aspects of melancholy. He 
considered that an intense intellectual reflection can have important physiological 
consequences. Along the same theoretical line, Rufus of Ephesus ( c. 80-150) noted 
that constant thinking and worrying give rise to melancholy and that the most subtle 
and refined minds are more susceptible to it (Minois, 2003, pp. 16-19). 
Other early conceptions of melancholy associated it with mentally abnormal and 
intellectual men, identifying it as a source of genius. Problemata XXX.1, a work 
allegedly written by Aristotle (384-322 BCE), first associated the melancholic 
temperament-which is not mainly conceived as the product of a disease but as a 
constitution with a natural preponderance of black bile-with literary and intellectual 
genius (Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, 1964, pp. 15-41 ). 
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Interestingly, there is a profound link between ancient empirical medicine, or 
Empiricism, and Pyrrhonism, 8 a school of ancient Greek scepticism. According to 
Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, the theory of humours originated from Empiricism 
( 1964, p. 9). But, in spi te of this link, both schools have subtle differences. 
James Allen (200 1) points out the distinctions and similarities between ancient 
Empiricism and Pyrrhonism. He notes that the Empirics questioned the use of 
rational methods in medicine. Such methods were criticised, according to Allen, 
because they point to careless speculative conclusions about non-evident matters that 
go beyond what could be discovered by mere experience or phenomena. 
For Allen, the Pyrrhonists-including one of their heads, Sextus Empiricus-
disagreed with the dogmatic view of the Empirics, which both asserts the 
truthfulness of perceptual evidence and claims that non-evident matters are 
unknowable. On the other hand, Sextus and the Pyrrhonists questioned both the 
possibility and impossibility of grasping evident and non-evident matters, thus 
temporarily suspending judgement about all matters (2001, pp. 97-99). Yet, notes 
Allen, it is very hard to prove that a Pyrrhonist really suspends judgement about all 
matters because a Pyrrhonist a1so daims to follow phenomena atone-holding 
beliefs about evident matters, thus blurring the initial distinctions between 
8 One traditional philosophical problem involves the question of how to maintain tranquillity, or 
non-disturbance of the mind, in the face of hardship. More than two thousand years ago, the 
Pyrrhonian sceptics formulated a plausible solution to such problem. Their solution is often associated 
with the work of Sextus Empiricus (Sextus, Annas and Bames, 2000) who summarizes and explains 
the main tenets of Pyrrhonism. The Pyrrhonian sceptics devised a series of methods, or "modes," in 
order to attain the suspension of belief, or epochë. Although they valued the non-disturbance of the 
soul, or ataraxia, they did not claim that it is attainable or caused by the suspension of belief. Instead, 
they simply observed, without offering any further claims or causal explanation, that ataraxia just 
happens to follow the suspension of belief unexpectedly. Broadly speaking, for the Pyrrhonists, the 
suspension ofbelief, or epochë, is attained through the art ofbalancing two opposing beliefs (or what 
they cali isosthenia). The suspension of belief is not needed when dealing with mere appearances, or 
how things seem to particular individuals, but only when there is disagreement about how things 
really are. The solution proposed by the Pyrrhonian sceptics is often subject to the critique that life 
without belief is impossible. This accusation is based on the questionable opinion that belief is 
indispensable for action. 
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Pyrrhonism and Empiricism. Nonetheless, such blurring of differences is only 
superficial, since what Pyrrhonists and Empirics mean by "evident" and "non-
evident" is not quite the same thing (2001, p. 100).9 
Interestingly enough, there are important similarities between Hume's scepticism and 
ancient Pyrrhonism. 10 Nonetheless, the present research is concemed neither with 
exploring such similarities nor with analysing the classic philosophical problem 
involving the tenability or liveability of scepticism. 11 
1.2.2 The Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
The link between the medical and philosophical aetiology of melancholy does not 
pertain exclusively to ancient times. In medieval medicine, Constantinus Africanus 
(c. 1020-1087), a Tunisian medical scholar, Benedictine, and translator of Arabie 
medical works into Latin, associated melancholy with overexertion in reading 
philosophical and scientific books. According to him, excess of study is a cause of 
mental fatigue and melancholy '(Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, 1964, pp. 84-85). 
According to Constantinus, religious and solitary people are prone to melancholy and 
a cure for it cannot be found solely in medicine, but in a reorganization of the ill 
9 Due to the limits of this work, 1 am not discussing ali the issues here. However, it should suffi ce 
to mention the deep and complex historical link between the theory of humours, ancient empirical 
medicine, and Pyrrhonian scepticism. These three them es are relevant for the present study. 
10 For instance, Louis Loeb notes: "Hume is working within a philosophical tradition that 
emphasizes the desirability of ataraxia, a state of quietude, in which one is tranquil or not disturbed" 
(2002, pp. 6-7). For Richard Popkin (1951), Hume offers the only "consistent" form of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism because he distinguishes philosophical doubt from naturally or psychologically produced 
belief. 
11 The liveability problem entails the charge made to Pyrrhonian sceptics that li fe without belief is 
impossible. This accusation is based on the questionable notion that belief is indispensable for action. 
Thus, someone without beliefs would be neither able to make any decisions nor get by in the world. 
She would be fatally paralyzed. For more on this topic cf. Barnes (1982), Burnyeat (1983), and 
Burnyeat and Frede (1997). 
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person's life, which involves the six "non naturals": air, food and drink, retention and 
expulsion, rest and exercise, sleep and wakefulness, and the passions of the soul 
(Starobinski, 2012, pp. 59-60). 
The ancient and pseudo-Aristotelian understanding of the creative melancholic 
genius pervaded up until the conception of the Renaissance's melancholic 
intellectual. The Italian Renaissance philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) notes 
in his Three Books on Life ([1489] 1989}--a work dealing with the concems and 
health of the intellectual-that artists and students are prone to suffer from 
melancholy. The symptoms described by the studio us Hume in his Letter to a 
physician seem to be a good example of this observation. 
The medieval British physician and clergyman Timothie Bright (1551-1615), author 
of A Treatise of Melancholie (1586), 12 attempted to reconcile the theological and 
psychosomatic explanations of melancholy. As a physician, he remained faithful to 
the Hippocratic tradition, which explains melancholy as an excess of black bile that 
provokes sadness by its influence on the mind. For Bright, "shortness ofbreathing," 
"an unnaturall boyling ofheate, with wyndines under the left side," and a "palpitation 
of the heart" are sorne of the symptoms of melancholy (pp. 121-122). In connection 
with Bright's observation, Hume mentions in his Letter to a physician that he has 
suffered from "[p]alpitation ofthe heart," and "[w]ind in[ ... his] [s]tomach" (p. 15). 
Five chapters of Bright's Treatise are dedicated to religious melancholy resulting 
from fear of condemnation to etemal punishment in Hell. Bright claims that the 
Devil can play an important role when melancholy strikes. By taking advantage of 
the doubts, despair, and fear associated with melancholy, the Devil can push the 
12 The complete title of Bright's work is A Treatise of Melancholy: Contayning the Causes 
Thereof, and Reasons of the Straunge Effects lt Worketh in Our Minds and Bodies: With the Phisicke 
Cure, and Spirituall Consolation for Such as Haue Thereto Adioyned Affiicted Conscience. For a 
complete citation, see the list of references at the end of this thesis. 
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melancholic to sin by making him question his own religious faith. This aspect of 
Bright's work is relevant if one keeps in mind M.A. Stewart's suggestion that Hume's 
crisis is due to an introspective religious examination (2005, p. 30). 
Like sorne of his predecessors, Bright also studied the effects of excessive 
intellectual work which, according to him, throw the spirits that are indispensible to 
one's natural beat out of balance (Minois, 2003, pp. 149-151). In connection with this 
theory, Hume's Letter to a physician exemplifies how intellectual excess can throw 
the spirits of the juvenile scholar off balance. 
1.2.3 The seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
Medical definitions had an important role in the shift from humoral theory to the 
New Science. Thomas Willis (1621-1675) deviated from the theory of bodily fluids 
while following the iatrochemical school, which considers the basic chemical 
components of the human body as causes of disease and health. Willis explains 
melancholy by saying that "animal spirits," which in healthy people are "transparent, 
subtle, lucid," become "obscure, thick, and dark" in the melancholic (quoted in 
Lawlor, 2012, pp. 74-75). 
Following a graduai scientific shift during the Enlightenment, the Scot William 
Cullen (1710-1790), Hume's physician and friend (Mossner, 1980, p. 247), explained 
disease and health through the nervous system. For Cullen, the malfunction or 
excitability of the nervous system, particularly the brain, was considered a possible 
cause of melancholy (Lawlor, 2012, p. 82). Cullen changed the basic elements in his 
physiology from the vascular system and the heart, to the nervous system and the 
brain (Jackson, 1986, pp. 124-125). In spi te of this theoretical shi ft, Cullen's 
remedies against melancholy were similar to those of his predecessors. However, 
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instead of suggesting one get rid of harmful humours, he advises that one get rid of 
waste matter in the blood through the surgical removal of blood, purges, and vomits 
(Lawlor, 2012, p. 83). 
The medical claims explaining the causes, symptoms, and treatment of melancholy 
remained oddly stable from their origins in classical antiquity up to the late 
Renaissance (Lawlor, 2012, p. 37). In spite of advancements in cardiovascular 
physiology and iatrochemistry, 13 the explanations of the pathogenesis of melancholia 
that prevailed during the second quarter of the seventeenth century still referred to 
the traditional theory of humours and excess of black bile (Jackson, 1986, pp. 113-
114). Indeed, comrnon seventeenth-century treatments against melancholy remained 
chiefly in agreement with Galenic medicine, such as: 
bloodletting, cathartics, and emetics, which were aimed at evacuating the 
melancholic humour. Diet was also to be light and easily digested, with 
attention to warm and moist foods in this cold and dry disease. Also 
emphasized were cheerful company and diverting activities, warm bathing, and 
moderate exercise (Jackson, 1986, p. 131). 
Offering a different perspective than the above observations, David Fate Norton and 
Mary J. Norton claim that: 
Although Hume talks about the 'mixture of humours' at [T] 2.1.12.2 [SBN p. 
325], by the 1730s few physicians were still using Galen's categories. The 
newer theory divided the humours, now meaning the fluid parts of the body, 
into nutritious, natural, and morbid ([1739-40] 2007c, p. 791). 
In view of the diversity of opinions, it is difficult to assess the degree of variation in 
the medical conception of melancholy during Hume's time. The remainder of this 
chapter shows how the conception of melancholy in the eighteenth century differed 
13 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, iatrochemistry was a school of thought seeking 
to understand physiology and medicine in terms of chemistry. 
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from the long-lasting Hippocratic one of melancholy as an excess of black bile. It 
also shows a continuity of the old remedies of evacuations, moderate exercise, a light 
diet, and distractions from thinking too much. These elements are crucial to 
understanding Hume's conception of, and solution to, sceptical melancholy. 
1.3 The conception of melancholy in the eighteenth century 
According to Clark Lawlor, during the eighteenth century, there was a graduai but 
important perceptual shift in the way melancholy was understood. Alchemy was 
replaced with chemistry, and Galenic humours with "nerves, spirits, and fibres." In 
Lawlor's own words: 
The balancing act of the humours to keep the body healthy was replaced, 
gradually and unevenly, even into the nineteenth century, by different 
conceptions of a balanced bodily economy based on more mechanistic and 
chemical ideas of flows that might be locked, or chemical imbalances that 
should be corrected (2012, p. 43). 
The explanation of melancholy during Hume's time differed from the old theory of 
humours by its incorporation of new physiological elements such as "nerves." 
However, the description of their symptoms and remedies was still heavily 
influenced by the traditional conception of melancholy. Although the actual 
explanation of Hume's disease remains uncertain, the case of hypochondria portrayed 
in his Letter to a physician is paradigmatic of how the "Disease of the Learned" (p. 
14) was culturally conceived and treated. 
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Offering a slightly different perspective, Samuel Johnson's14 (1709-1784) Dictionary 
description of melancholy reveals its meaning in eighteenth-century England: 
MELANCHOL Y. n.f [melancolie, French; from JlÉÀ.avoç and xoJ.:fJ.] 1. A 
disease, supposed to proceed from a redundance of black bile; but it is better 
known to arise from too heavy and too viscid blood; its cure is in evacuation, 
nervous medicines, and powerful stimuli. [ ... ] 2. A kind of madness, in which 
the mind is always fixed on one object. [ ... ] 3. A gloomy, pensive, 
discontented temper (Johnson, 1756). 
Foremost, this description is indicative of the Greek origin ofthe term, as well as the 
predominant medical explanations of the disease as either an excess of black bile or a 
thickening of the blood. The remedies listed by Johnson (e.g. "evacuation, nervous 
medicines, and powerful stimuli") offer a good indication of how this illness was 
generally treated. 
1t is important to note the big disparity between the severity implied in the second 
definition, which depicts an obsessive "kind of madness," and the clearly milder 
definition of melancholy as a "gloomy, pensive, discontented temper" (Johnson, 
1756). The contrast between these two definitions is helpful to grasp Hume's own 
understanding of the disease, as he describes in his Letter to a physician that "there 
seems to be as great a [ d]ifference betwixt my [ d]istemper & common [v ]apours, as 
betwixt [v ]apours & [rn ]adness" (p.17). 
In addition to the conception of melancholy prevalent in England, it is plausible that 
the French conception of the so-called "English Malady" influenced Hume's own 
14 Johnson is famous for his work as an author and lexicographer. He is Jess known, however, for 
having struggled with melancholy throughout his life. The first of his two severe and debilitating 
episodes of melancholy likely started at the relatively young age of twenty, in the summer of 1729, 
and lasted approximately three years. Johnson fought the symptoms of melancholy with the usual 
remedies: Exercise and distractions. He was known to have regularly walked thirty miles between 
Lichfield and Birmingham (Rogers, 2009). 
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idea of this disease during his residence in France, from 1734 to 1737, while 
composing his Treatise (Mossner, 1980, p. 74). Indeed, the English conception of 
melancholy in the eighteenth century was partially a by-product of French 
stereotyping, which the following section explores. 
1.3 .1 French stereotyping 
According to Eric Gidal (2003), French Enlightenment intellectuals such as Voltaire, 
Montesquieu, Prévost, and Staël associated melancholy and political freedom as 
characteristic and inextricable features of the English nation. Gloom, suicide, 
despair, a harsh climate, philosophical speculation, suspicion of social mores, and 
civic harmony constituted, according to Gidal, the stereotype that French 
intellectuals made of the English. 
Similarly, Jeffrey Hopes (2011) notes that the pathological disorder characterized by 
the melancholic Englishman was a frequent stereotype in French literature. 
According to Hopes, for sorne French writers, the so-called "English Malady" was 
mainly a disease of the soul. The seriousness, introspection, pensiveness, ennui, and 
meditative spirit of the English were judged as anomalous when compared to the 
playfulness and cheerfulness characteristic of the stereotype of the French. Diet, 
humours, weather, idleness, sedentariness, and opulence constituted just sorne of the 
most common explanations for this English anomaly of the soul. 
Not only eighteenth century French writers recognized the relevance of English 
melancholy. Morbid psychology was also a topic of interest at that time in England. 
Literature from and immediately preceding this period abounds with reflections on 
melancholy. Sorne of the most distinguished early-modem English intellectuals 
writing about melancholy and having a considerable influence on the conception of 
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this disease were Robert Burton, John Arbuthnot, Bernard de Mandeville, and 
George Cheyne. 15 These authors, whose work is explored in the following sections, 
studied the aetiology, symptomatology, and treatment of melancholy-relevant 
aspects that help understand Hume's conception and solution to sceptical 
melancholy. 
1.3.2 Robert Burton 
Robert Burton16 (1577-1640) is best known for having written The Anatomy of 
Melancholy ([1621] 1800), an encyclopaedic work dealing with the different kinds of 
melancholy, their causes, symptoms, and cures. Although there is no evidence that 
Hume had this text in his library (Norton and Norton, 1996) 17, 1 dedicate a 
considerable portion of this chapter to Burton's work because his compendium of 
human suffering and madness was a significant contribution to the eighteenth 
15 Cheyne also acknowledges the cultural influence of continental Europe in shaping the 
conception of melancholy as a typically English disorder. In this respect, he writes: "The title 1 have 
chosen for this Treatise [The English Ma/at~.']. is a Reproach universally thrown in this Island by 
Foreigners, and al/ our Neighbours on the Continent, by whom nervous Distempers, Spleen, Vapours, 
and Lowness of Spirits, are in Derision, ca/led the ENGLISH MALA DY. And 1 wish there were no so 
good Grounds for this Rejlection. The Moisture of our Air, the Variableness of our Weather, (from 
our Situation amidst the Ocean) the Rankness and Fertility of our Soi/, the Richness and Heaviness of 
our Food, the Wealth and Abundance of the lnhabitants (from the ir universal Trade) the Inactivity 
and sedentary Occupations of the better Sort (among whom this Evil most/y rages) and the Humour of 
living in great, populous and consequent/y unhealthy Towns, have brought forth a Class and Set of 
Distempers, with atrocious andfrightfùl Symptoms, scarce known to our Ancestors [ ... ]" (1733, pp. 
Preface i-ii). 
16 Burton was born in Leicestershire, England. For most of his !ife, and until his death, he was a 
student of Christ Church Co liege in Oxford. In 1624, he was appointed librarian of Christ Church, a 
position that he kept until the end of his life. From a young age, Burton suffered from melancholy. He 
wrote about it, among other reasons, in order to avoid his own suffering (Bamborough, 2009). 
17 No catalogue of Hume's library survives. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (1996) have 
reconstructed it based on the list of books possessed by Hume's nephew, David Hume the Younger, 
who inherited the books owned by Hume and his brother and sister. Burton's work is absent from this 
account. 
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century conception of melancholy (Radden, 2000, pp. 129-130) and might have 
indirectly influenced Hume's conception of melancholy. Moreover, there are striking 
similarities between Burton's and Hume's writings about melancholy. 
In accordance with the Hippocratic theory of humours, Burton understands 
melancholy as an excess of black bile. He explains the causes of such excess as 
loneliness, lack of exercise, idleness, and an inappropriate diet. For instance, Burton 
cites Crato's explanation of how an inactive lifestyle interferes with the elimination 
of bodil y residues, which accumulate in the body and cause excessive black bile: 
Opposite to Exercise, is Idleness (the badg of gentry) or want of Exercise, the 
bane of body and minde [ ... ] 'For the minde can never rest, but still mediates 
on one thing or other, except it be occupied about sorne honest business, of his 
own accord it rusheth into melancholy. As too much and violent exercise 
offends on the one si de, so doth an idle life on the other ( saith Crato) it fills the 
body full of flegm, gross humors, and all manner of obstructions, rheumes, 
catars, &c.' (Anatomy 1.2.2.6). 
In this passage, one can appreciate the positive role that moderate exercise can have 
in distracting the mind from its own spiralling, melancholic, and restless thoughts. 
Burton ( quoting Crato) warns against any ex cess of exercise, which can also be 
harmful. Moderation in exercise, he argues, is a viable prescription against the 
gloomy effects of excessive thinking and an aid in the evacuation of certain harmful 
humours from the body. In connection with this remedy, Hume explicitly mentions 
the benefits of exercise-particularly frequent horseback riding and daily walking 
(Letter to a physician, p. 15). In addition, it will be shown in the next chapter how 
one can learn from Hume's Treatise about the usefulness and immediate 
agreeableness of moderating excessive thinking. 
Burton relies on Seneca when explaining how solitude is a cause of melancholy, for 
which occupations, distractions, employment, physicallabour, and pleasant company 
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are the best remedies, particularly for those already habituated to such activities or 
company: 
Especially if they [those tormented with melancholy] have been formerly 
brought up to business, or to keep much company, and upon a sudden come to 
lead a sedentary life, it crucifies their souls, and seazeth on them in an instant; 
for whilst they are any ways imployed [sic], in action, discourse, about any 
business, sport or recreation, or in company to their liking, they are very well; 
but if alone or idle, tormented instantly again; one day's solitariness, one hour's 
sometimes, doth [sic] them more harm, than a week's physick, labor and 
company can do good. Melancholy seazeth on them forthwith being alone, and 
is such a torture, that as wise Seneca well saith, Malo mihi malè quam mo/liter 
esse, 1 had rather be sick than idle. This idleness is either of body or minde 
(Anatomy 1.2.2.6). 
In relation to this observation, Hume's Letter to a physician offers evidence that his 
youth is plagued with intense solitary moments. These moments preceded and were 
present during his hypochondriac crisis. Although he is not idle as his arduous 
studies keep him busy, it is reasonable to think that the loneliness of his studious life 
makes his emotional life uneasy. In his Treatise, Hume notes that even the most 
powerful person on earth would be miserable in complete solitude, because he would 
lack the pleasure associated with the company of others (T 2.2.5.15, SBN p. 363). 
Burton also warns his reader against a voluntary type of solitude-that is, one that 
could be avoided by engaging in society. At first, such voluntary solitude may seem 
alluring to the melancholic, especially to the meditative and scholarly type. But 
Burton cautions that this is a trap that one should stay away from because it is 
ultimately conducive to despair and a negative state of mind: 
Voluntary solitariness is that which is familiar with Melancholy, and gently 
brings on like a Siren, a shooing-horn, or sorne Sphinx to this irrevocable gulf, 
a primary cause, Piso calls it; most pleasant it is at first, to such as are 
melancholy given, to lie in bed whole days, and keep their chambers, to walk 
al one in sorne solitary Grove [ ... ] until at last the Scene is turned upon a 
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sudden, by sorne bad object, and they being now habituated to such vain 
meditations and solitary places, can endure no company, can ruminate of 
nothing but harsh and distasteful subjects. Fear, sorrow, suspition, subrusticus 
pudor [Latin for "clownish shame"], discontent, cares, and weariness of life 
surprise them in a moment, and they can think of nothing else, continually 
suspecting, no sooner are their eyes open, but this infernal plague of 
Melancholy seizeth on them, and terrifies their souls [ ... ] (Anatomy 1.2.2.6). 
Burton finds, throughout his own scholarly life, that immoderate study is conducive 
to reclusiveness, which in turn is conducive to melancholy. His advice is to resist the 
temptation to be alone and to join others in society or, at least, to try to avoid solitude 
at all costs. Emphatically, Burton prescribes: "[ ... ]a melancholy discontented person 
(be it in what kinde of melancholy soever) never be left alone or idle" (Anatomy 
2.2.6.2). 
There is an interesting parallel between Burton's direction to avoid loneliness and a 
passage from Book II of Hume's Treatise, in which he acknowledges that the 
company of another person can be both a distraction from melancholy and a source 
of pleasure, particularly when that person communicates her thoughts and 
sentiments: 
[ ... ] company is naturally so reJmcmg, as presenting the live li est of all 
objects, viz. a rational and thinking Being like ourselves, who communicates to 
us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and 
affections; and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the 
emotions, which are caus'd by any object (T 2.2.4.4, SBN pp. 356-357).18 
In this passage Hume observes that the lively company of others excites the mind 
and averts falling into melancholy and hopelessness. In a similar way than Burton, 
Hume implies that avoiding solitude is a good antidote to melancholy. 
18 The full passage is quoted below, in section 2.3 of this thesis. 
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Burton also dedicates a lengthy section of his Anatomy to explaining melancholy as a 
result of a disproportionate love of learning and engaging in excessive study. He 
believes that the desk-bound life of the student is prone to be inactive and solitary. 
Excess of study and contemplation also play a crucial role in obstructing the 
elimination ofharmful humours and vapours from the body: 
[ ... ] 'tis the common T enent of the world, that Learning duls and diminisheth 
the spirits, and so per consequens produceth melancholy. Two main reasons 
may be given of it, why Students should be more subject to this malady than 
others. The one is, they live a sedentary, solitary life, sibi & musis, free from 
bodily exercise, and those ordinary disports which other men use: and many 
times if discontent and idleness concur with it, which is too frequent, they are 
precipitated into this gulph on a sudden: but the common cause is overmuch 
study; [ ... ] The second is contemplation, 'which dries the brain and 
extinguisheth natural heat; for whilst the spirits are intent to meditation above 
the head, the stomack and liver are left destitute, and thence come black blood 
and crudities by defect of concoction, and for want of exercise the superfluous 
vapours cannot exhale,' &c. (Anatomy 1.2.3.15). 
In this passage, one can appreciate the twofold harm experienced by devoted 
students. First, excessive study fosters a lack of exercise, company, and the 
amusements that most non-studious people enjoy, thus debilitating the mind. Second, 
contemplation "dries the brain and extinguisheth natural heat." Note here the possible 
link between Burton's observation regarding the extinction of natural heat and the 
use of the term " [ c ]oldness" in Hume's Letter to a physician. Hume uses this term to 
describe the waning interest in his studies, which he initially fears is due to his own 
laziness or a defect in his intelligence (Letter to a physician, pp. 13-14 ). 
For Burton, excessive thinking and contemplation-the prime activities of scholars 
and philosophers-impede the exhalation of harmful vapours from the body, thereby 
causing disease. Interestingly, Burton refers to "black blood," as opposed to black 
bile. Perhaps the shift from black bile to black blood could be explained by the, then 
recent, influence of the aforementioned advances in cardiovascular physiology and 
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iatrochemistry. In any case, Burton believes that excess of studies, loneliness, and 
lack of exercise are among the chief causes of melancholy. 
Referring to the symptoms of melancholy, Burton quotes other intellectuals: 
[ ... ] hard Students are commonly troubled with Gouts, Catarrhes, Rhumes, 
Cacexia [ 19], Bradiopepsia e0 ], bad Eyes, Stone, and Collick, Crudities, 
Oppilations, Vertigo, Windes, Consumptions, and ali such diseases as come by 
overmuch sitting; they are most part lean, dry, ill coloured, spend their 
fortunes, lose their wits, and many times their lives, and ali through 
immoderate pains, and extraordinary studies (Anatomy 1.2.3.15). 
This extensive list of symptoms makes the diagnosis of melancholy difficult and 
unclear, which is typical of the eighteenth century conception of this disease. In fact, 
many devoted students with physical or mental discomforts could fit into the above 
symptomatology. For instance, in his Letter to aphysician, Hume mentions suffering 
from sorne ofthe above listed symptoms, such as "weakness" and "[w]ind in[ ... his] 
[s]tomach" (p. 15). 
In spite of the vague description and long list of symptoms mentioned by Burton, the 
account Hume offers in his Letter to a physician seems to fit the description of 
Burton's zealous student whose health is affected by excessive learning. This is likely 
if one considers that Hume links his symptoms to his excessive studies. In his Letter 
to a physician he mentions "a strong Inclination to Books & Letters" (p.13), "to 
Books of Reasoning & Philosophy, & to Poetry & the polite Authors" (p.13), 
"having read many Books of Morality, such as Cicero, Seneca & Plutarch" (p. 14), 
19 The Physical Dictionary defines cachexia [sic] as "an Ill Habit of Body, proceeding from an ill 
Disposition of the Humours of the Body; whence lingrin [sic] Fevers, Consumptions, and Dropsies are 
contracted; In this Disease the Face is often pale, and discoloured, and the Body big, and swoln [sic]; 
[ ... ]"(Blankaart, 1702, p. 46). 
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"Bradipepsia" [sic] is defined by the Physical Dictionary as "slow Digestion, proceeding from a 
depraved Disposition of the Acid Ferment in the Stomack" (Blankaart, 1702, p. 42). 
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"Reading most the celebrated Books in Latin, French & English, & acquiring the 
ltalian" (p. 16), and his acknowledgement that "there are two things very bad for this 
Distemper, Study & Idleness" (p. 17). 
1.3.3 John Arbuthnot 
John Arbuthnot's21 (1667-1735) first important medical work, An Essay Concerning 
the Nature of Aliments, and the Choice of them, According to the Different 
Constitutions of Human Bodies, appears in 1 731. In this work and its subsequent 
editions, Arbuthnot offers cautious advice about the effects of diet on health, which 
vary according to a person's physical condition (Ross, 2004). 
According to a plausible reconstruction of Hume's own library,22 he possessed a 
copy of Arbuthnot's Misce/laneous Works (1770). More pertinent to the present work 
is the possibility that Arbuthnot is actually the intended addressee of Hume's Letter 
to a physician. The following paragraphs point to sorne relevant passages in the work 
of Arbuthnot that help elucidate the conception and treatment of melancholy in the 
eighteenth century. 
Arbuthnot follows the medical tradition of explaining melancholy as a darkening and 
thickening ofthe bodily fluids, particularly the blood: 
We come now to what we may cali the earthy or atrabilarian Constitution, 
where the spirituous and most fluid Parts of the Blood are dissipated, that is the 
Spirit, Water and subtile Oil so much evaporated, asto leave the Salts, Earth, 
and grosser Oil in too great a Proportion. The Blood grows darkish and thick, 
such a Constitution the Ancients call'd Atrabilarian or melancholick (1731, p. 
200). 
21 Scottish physician and satirist based in London. 
22 See item 63 in Norton and Norton, 1996. 
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Arbuthnot thinks that sorne persons have a tendency to be of a melancholic 
constitution. Such persons are recognizable for having a darkened physiognomy, dry 
skin, a slim or skinny body, a witty mind, and a slow respiration and pulse. He 
explains that the causes for this illness include: intense thinking about one thing in 
particular, excessive exercise in hot weather and unquenched thirst, food that is hard 
to digest ( dried and salted meat, immature fruits, unfermented floury substances), 
and excessive use of alcoholic beverages. These factors remove the most vaporous 
compounds of the blood and lodge the re si due in the circulatory system. In turn, this 
thick and tacky blood produces: 
Stagnation, Obstructions, Acrimony, Putrefactions, Viscidity, and imperfect 
Secretion of the Gall, a defective Circulation, especially in the lateral Branches 
destined to separate the more fluid Parts, and therefore viscous, and sparing 
Secretions in the Glands: The Blood moving too slowly through the celiack 
and mesenterick Arteries, produce various Complaints in the lower Bowels and 
Hypochondres; from whence such Persons are call'd Hypochondriack [ ... ] 
Such a State of the Fluids at last affects the tender capillary V essels of the 
Brain by the Viscidity and Immeability of the Matter impacted in them, and 
disorders the Imagination, and at last produceth Corruption in the Bowels of 
the lower Belly (1731, pp. 201-203). 
The symptoms by which Arbuthnot exp lains the mental and physical troubles of the 
hypochondriac or melancholic are relatively straightforward: the thickening of the 
blood dulis the circulatory mechanisms, delaying or preventing proper secretions of 
bodil y fluids which, if untreated, cri pp le the functions of the digestive system and the 
brain. The mention of circulatory and nervous systems, inconceivable notions in the 
long-standing theory of humours, is a novelty in Arbuthnot's theory. 
In spite of this explanatory novelty, Arbuthnot suggests, as did sorne of his 
predecessors, that one can avoid such an undesirable condition mainly through a 
light and simple diet: 
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The Diet [of the melancholic] ought to be opposite to the particular Acrimony, 
whether acid or alkaline [ ... ]. lt ought to be demulcent, in both Cases light, and 
of easy Digestion, moistening and resolvent of the Bile; of such Nature are 
vegetable Soaps [sic], as Honey, and the Juices of ripe Fruits, sorne of the 
cooling, lactescent, papescent [sic] Plants, as Cichory [sic], Letuce [sic], 
Dandelion, which are found effectuai in hot Countries ( 1731, p. 204 ). 
Such a light diet should be complemented by an administration of remedies to ease 
and promote bodily secretions, particularly the bile, allowing them to flow out of the 
body. 
Although Hume's Letter to a physician does not mention any specifie foods 
composing his diet, his dietary habits are not in disagreement with Arbuthnot's 
recommendations. For instance, when Hume mentions improvement in his health, he 
also mentions being " [ ... ] very regular in my [his] di et and way of life from the 
beginning" (Letter to a physician, p.15). He also mentions the unsettling effects of 
excessive eating as he recounts that: 
[ ... ] for next summer, about May 1 731 the re grew upon me [Hume] a very 
ravenous appetite, and as quick a digestion, which 1 at first took for a good 
symptom, and was very much surprised to find it bring back a palpitation of 
heart, which 1 had felt very little of before. This appetite, however, had an 
effect very unusual, which was to nourish me extremely; so that in six weeks' 
time, 1 passed from the one extreme to the other (Letter to a physician, p.l5). 
In addition to Hume's eating habits, there is sufficient reason to think that Hume's 
drinking habits are regular and moderate since he mentions drinking " [ ... ] an English 
pint of claret wine every day" (Letter to a physician, p.l4). Such moderation is in 
line with Arbuthnot's recommendation against the excessive use of alcoholic 
beverages. As 1 will show in the next chapter, a different kind of moderation 
constitutes the outcome of two conflicting passions (the love of truth and 
melancholy) and the beliefs associated with these passions (the pursuit ofknowledge 
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through the use of reason and the loss of hope in attaining knowledge ), which Hume 
mentions in the Treatise. 
1.3 .4 Bernard de Mandeville 
Bernard de Mandeville23 (1670-1733) is most famous for writing The Fable ofthe 
Bees ([1714] 1723), one of the most important works in British moral philosophy. 
Hume read Mandeville (Norton, 2000, p. 1 12) and his persona! library collection 
apparently included Mandeville's Fable24 (Norton and Norton, 1996). Nonetheless, 
the work that is of chief relevance here is Mandeville's Treatise of the 
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases ([1711] 1730)-not because there is 
evidence that Hume read this book, but because it is influential in shaping the system 
ofbeliefs about melancholy in the eighteenth century. 
Mandeville's Treatise consists of a set of dialogues between a physician (Philopirio) 
and his hypochondriac patient (Misomedon), in which the speculative theories and 
remedies prescribed by contemporary physicians and apothecaries are criticized, and 
preference is given to treatments based on observation. 
Grounded in empirical evidence, Mandeville notes that the "Disease of the Leamed" 
is partly the result of a lack of exercise. Using the character of Misomedon as a 
mouthpiece, Mandeville recounts a successful approach to melancholy: 
1 remain'd in tolerable Health ali the succeeding Summer, and, to prevent the 
retum of my Distemper, 1 went through a Steel Course, and after that to the 
23 Physician and moral philosopher born and raised in Rotterdam who settled in London in 1693 
(Goldsmith, 2004). 
24 Mandeville's work is included in the list of books that, according to manuscript sources, formed 
part of David Hume's Iibrary. See note 17 of this thesis. 
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Bath, where I drank the hot Waters the whole Autumn Season; and using much 
Exercise, especially Ri ding, I continu'd very well ([ 1711] 1730, p. 28). 
Such prescription for moderate exercise and distractions is in line with all the 
remedies presented so far in this chapter. More importantly, moderate exercise, in the 
form of regular horseback riding and walking, is repeatedly mentioned in Hume's 
Letter to a physician as an activity that ameliorates his condition (p.15). 
In the second dialogue of his Treatise, Mandeville challenges established medical 
beliefs through the voice of Philopirio. The physician criticizes the lack of scientific 
rigour in the predominant medical hypotheses, saying that a viscous stagnation of 
blood in the spleen irritates the "animal spirits," affecting the brain and accounting 
for the distempered condition, wittiness, and ingeniousness of melancholic persons. 
Philopirio's critique is influenced by contemporary physiological discoveries of 
blood circulation and digestion, which make the hypothesis of blood thickening and 
stagnation in the spleen seem implausible ([ 1711] 1730, pp. 100-1 05). 
Speaking about the "Disease of the Learned," Philopirio notes that hypochondriacs 
are generally men of sense. But, he denies that a stagnation of blood in the spleen (or 
other abdominal organs) is the cause of either sagacity or hypochondria. In fact, the 
empirical explanation he offers is that, because men of learning are continually tiring 
their heads with intense thinking and studying, they neglect to exercise their bodies 
([ 1711] 1730, p. 1 06). In a different section, Philopirio praises the benefits of 
exercise in warding off melancholy. He says that exercise fosters enthusiasm for 
food, aids digestion, helps to remove obstructions, and makes the blood and the 
whole body stronger. He adds that: 
Exercise is so necessary to all People that use a plentiful and nutritious Diet, 
that by the musculary [sic] Motions, the Spirits, which from their Blood are 
separated in great abundance, may be shook off and eliminated before they can 
prove prejudicial ([ 1711] 1730, p. 166). 
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Philopirio expounds wh y melancholy is often called the "Disease of the Learned." He 
notes that there are more schplars and studious persons suffering from melancholy 
than those of any other occupational group. He exp lains that leaning of the stomach 
and the region of the thorax immediately in front of the heart against large books, 
tables, and desks may hinder the circulation of humours, thus contributing to the 
scholar's disease. Additionally, he mentions that people with sedentary trades or 
occupations, such as merchants, artists, or people owning an estate, suffer from 
melancholy to a lesser degree than the scholars ([1711] 1730, pp. 216-217). By 
doing so, he perpetuates the myth, held also by Hume/5 that working-class people 
are less prone to melancholy than members of upper classes: 
Immoderate Grief, Cares, Troubles and Disappointments are likewise often 
Concomitant Causes of this Disease [of the Learned]; but most commonly in 
such, as either by Estate, Benefices, or Employments have a sufficient Revenue 
to make themselves easie [ ... ] Those that enjoy 'em [Riches and Possessions] 
are more at leisure to reflect, besides that their Wishes and Desires being 
larger, themselves are more likely to be offended at a great many Passages of 
Life, than People of lower Fortunes, who have sel dom higher Ends, than what 
they are continually employed about, the getting of their daily Bread ([1711] 
1730, pp. 219-220). 
In addition to the myth of poverty as immunity to melancholy, this passage also 
illustrates Mandeville's endorsement of employment as a remedy for it. For him, 
idleness-a privilege of the rich-----carries with it the opportunity to worry and think 
about disappointments and unfulfilled aspirations. 
Hume also endorses employment as a cure to his distemper. The closing paragraphs 
of his Letter to a physician mention that "study and idleness" worsen his condition, 
25 Jeremy Schmidt notes that most eighteenth century physicians conceive the sufferer of 
hypochondria to be a privileged member ofpolite society, distinguished from the labouring masses by 
the wit and sensibility of a refined nervous system (2007, p. 154). This belief retlects the pseudo-
Aristotelian myth associating melancho1y with intellectual genius, which Hume's youthful malaise 
exemplifies. Hume's biographer, E.C. Mossner, notes that Hume vainly thought that the vapours, or 
lowness of spirits, was a disease of the mind restricted to the idle rich (1980, p. 67). 
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and that "business and diversion" ameliorate it. Based on this finding, Hume resolves 
to take sorne distance from his sedentary and studio us life, albeit just temporarily, by 
pursuing the more active life of a merchant in Bristol. Hume thinks that such a 
choice is more suitable than being a travelling govemor, which he also believes 
would, in sorne respects, lead to an idle existence (Letter to a physician, pp. 17 -18). 
Once in Bristol, Hume worked for about four months as a clerk in a counting-house, 
before moving to France and resuming his studies (Mossner, 1980, pp. 88-91). 
Philopirio believes that not all thinking is equally harmful. For instance, he compares 
the thinking of "witty [m]en" against that of "[b]lockheads," noting that, even if the 
latter were to think for the same amount oftime, their slow, dull, and heavy thinking 
would not require as much sharpness and alertness as the elever thoughts of the 
former. He daims that half-asleep witty individuals may think as much as fully-
awake idiots, which partially explains why fools seldom suffer from melancholy, 
while geniuses, who tire their heads with intense thinking, so often do ([1711] 1730, 
pp. 237-238). 
If excessive thinking constitutes a characteristic of the melancholic, Philopirio 
prescribes moderation in the intensity and amount of thinking and, above all, seeking 
out distractions and stimulating activities: 
Ingenuity only makes them [the hypochondriacal] proper Subjects for the 
Disease to work upon, and the most witty Men, if they commit no Excess in 
those things that exhaust the finer Spirits, but divert themselves daily with 
Hunting, the Tenniscourt [sic], or other brisk Exercises, will be as exempt from 
the Distemper as the greatest Logger-heads ([1711] 1730, p. 238). 
Such prescription is fully in accordance with what other eminent physicians of the 
time recommended to attenuate the pain and uneasiness of melancholic spirits. The 
recommendation to think and study moderately and seek out distractions and 
entertainment is fully acknowledged and employed by Hume as an antidote against 
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both the condition he suffers in his youth (Letter to a physician, p. 14) and his more 
mature and complex sceptical melancholy (T 2.2.4.4, SBN pp. 352-353). 
Finally, Philopirio also ad vises on the proper amount of sleep for the melancholic: 
sleep should not be restricted, but rather extended. Y et, earl y rising is recommended 
and lying in bed after awaking is especially to be avoided. Such regimen will be 
achieved more easily if the above recommendations of daily exercise and 
employment are followed, making the tired melancholic long for sleep in the same 
way that a hungry person would yeam for food ([1711] 1730, pp. 341-342). In 
connection with this last point, Hume's regular exercise regime seems to benefit his 
sleeping habits. After mentioning thrice in his Letter to a physician that he horseback 
rides regularly, he also acknowledges: "1 sleep weil" (p. 15). 
1.3.5 George Cheyne 
Cheyne (1671-1743) was one of the most renowned medical specialists to write 
about melancholy and other mental disorders during the eighteenth century. Cheyne's 
treatise on mental health, The English Malady, deals with melancholy26 and hysteria, 
or hypochondria, or what is then referred to by the umbrella term "the vapours." 
Cheyne's biographer, Anita Guerrini (2000), mentions that he links intellectual 
capacity and a sensitive nervous system with hypochondriasis and melancholia, 
which is an eighteenth century myth-partially stemming from Aristotelian times-
that many of his colleagues also fostered. 
26 Stanley Jackson disagrees: "Despite often being cited as the prototypical study of melancholy 
for this era, Cheyne's work might better be referred to as a representative account of hypochondriasis 
in its eighteenth-century meanings, as his syndrome was only minimally related to traditional 
melancholia" (1986, p. 140). Nonetheless, one needs to keep in mind that, in the eighteenth century, 
melancholy and hypochondria were two interchangeable terms. Jackson's distinction seems to Jack 
insight. 
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Cheyne's selection for his book's title is not gratuitous. England's hostile weather and 
heavy foods contributed to its reputation as a place that would foster its inhabitants' 
low-spirits. Moreover, Cheyne perpetuated a myth that Hume also seemed to hold: 
idleness, particularly due to a recently acquired excess of wealth, is a factor that 
brings about melancholy. 
Although there is no direct evidence of Hume reading The English Malady, the 
relevance of Cheyne's work is threefold: 
i) The Physiological Library (Steuart, 1725, p. 21 ), an earl y catalogue of a collection 
of scientific, philosophical, and literary works to which Hume subscribed, includes 
Cheyne's Essay of Health and Long Life (1724). This fact suggests that Hume may 
have been acquainted with Cheyne and his work. 
ii) As aforesaid, Cheyne was one of two possible addressees for Hume's Letter to a 
physician. 
iii) Cheyne's work significantly shaped the medical and cultural notion of 
melancholy in the eighteenth century, which may have indirectly influenced Hume's 
understanding of the disease. 
A novelty in the conception of melancholy in Cheyne's work was his 
acknowledgement of the role nerves play in the explanation of nervous diseases. He 
writes that: "[ ... ] these Diseases [nervous distempers] are chiefly and properly called 
Nervous, whose Symptoms imply that the System of the Nerves and their Fibres, are 
evidently relax'd and broken" (1733, p. 14). Yet, in spite of such innovation, 
Cheyne's symptomatology of melancholy offered no new insight into the definition 
of the disease. The list and progression of symptoms is so illustrative of the 
vagueness in definitions of melancholy that it is worth ci ting at length: 
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The [first Degree] Symptoms [of Vapours] then, besides Lowness of Spirits, 
are Wind, Be/ching, Yawning, Heart-burning, Croaking of the Bowels (like the 
Noise of Frogs) a Pain in the Pit of the Stomach [ ... ] and sometimes there is an 
Inflation, and an actual visible Swelling, to a very considerable Bigness, in the 
Stomach to be seen, especially in the Sex; a Coldness or Chilliness upon the 
Extremities, and sometimes Flushing ( especially after a full Meal) and Burning 
in the Hands and Feet, Cold Damp Sweats, Faintings, [ ... ] Head-aches either 
behind or over the Eyes, like a Puncturation, Flies and Atoms dancing before 
the Eyes, a Noise like the dying Sounds of Bells, or a Fall of Water, in the Ears; 
Y awning, and Stretching, and sometimes a Drowsiness or Lethargy, at other 
times Watching and Restlessness, and several other Symptoms, which it is 
impossible to enumerate [ ... ]a Tendency to Spitting, Ptyalism, or a Discharge 
of the Phlegm from the Glands of the Throat, seldom fails to attend all the 
Symptoms of it [ ... ]. The second stage of this Distemper is attended with all 
these Symptoms, on a much higher and eminent Degree, and sorne new ones 
[ ... ] such as are instead of Lowness of Spirits: a deep and fixed Melancholy, 
wandering and delusory Images on the Brain, and Instability and Unsettledness 
in all the intellectual Operations, Loss of Memory, Despondency, Horror and 
Despair, a Vertigo, Giddiness or Staggering, Vomittings of Yellow, Green, or 
Black Choler: sometimes unaccountable Fits of Laughing, apparent Joy, 
Leaping and Dancing; at other Times, of Crying, Grief, and Anguish; and these 
generally terminate in Hypochondriacal or Hysterical Fits (1 mean Convulsive 
ones) and Faintings, which leave a Drowsiness, Lethargy, and extreme 
Lowness of Spirits for sorne Time afterwards. [ ... ] The State of the Blood is 
generally viscid [ ... ] [if the first and second Degrees are not cured] the third 
State begins, which is generally sorne morta/ and incurable Distemper, such as 
Dropsy, Black Jaundice, Consumption, Paisy, Epilepsy, or Apoplexy, &c. 
(1733, pp. 196-200). 
In his Letter to a physician, Hume mentions having suffered from sorne of the 
symptoms listed above, such as "[w]ind in [ ... his] [s]tomach" and "[p]tyalism or 
[ w ]ateryness in the mouth;" y et, he thrice denies having suffered from any 
"[l]owness of [ s ]pirits" (pp. 14-15; 17). 
A hypochondriac and melancholic himself,27 Cheyne proposes turning to God and 
religion as treatments and cures for hypochondriac melancholy. The link between 
27 By the end of the preface of The English Malady, Cheyne confesses to have found inward peace, 
health, and freedom of spirits by following the same guide tines he offers to others. 
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religion and melancholy is relevant because it shows how, for Cheyne, the passions 
of the soul have an effect on the body. Cheyne believes the body sim ply registers the 
state of the soul, and that the way to heal the body is through the moral care of the 
soul (Schmidt, 2007, p. 182; 186). The importance that Cheyne confers to religion in 
treating melancholy is significant if one keeps in mind Hume's plausible explanation 
for his disease. 
In his Letter to a physician, Hume suggests that his condition is parallel to the 
"[c]oldness & [d]esertion of the [s]pirit" described in the writings of the French 
mystics and local religious fanatics. For Hume, the passionate devotion of the mystic 
or religious fanatic produces "rapturous admirations [that] might discompose the 
fabric of the nerves and brain, as much as profound reflections, and that warmth or 
enthusiasm which is inseparable from them" (p.17). Hume believes, not unlike 
religious mystics, that the intense reflections driven by his passionate curiosity might 
be strong enough to damage his nerves and brain, impairing his enthusiasm and 
motivation to pursue his devoted activity. 
According to Cheyne, an idle, desk-bound, self-indulgent, and slothful lifestyle is 
associated with melancholy because such ways draw away from exercise, motion, 
and labour. Cheyne even cites certain luxuries of his time, such as coaches improved 
with springs, horses taught to pace, and chairmen trained to drive smoothly, as 
elements preventing bodily motion and thus leading to fixing obstructions in the 
small vessels, inhibiting the secretions that would alleviate the symptoms of 
melancholy (1733, p. 52). 
Like his colleagues, Cheyne emphasizes that moderate exercise is the most effective 
treatment against nervous distempers (1733, p. 172). The explanation for the benefits 
of exercise is that the bodily movements, especially when the body is erect, and the 
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change of air, facilitate the dilution and elimination of harmful and obstructive 
matters: 
It is of no great Consequence of what Sort or Kind the Exercise be, provided it 
be but Bodily Exercise and Action; certainly riding on Horse-back is the best of 
all, because of the almost erect Posture, the lesser Weariness, and the more 
universal and natural Motion of all the Organs, with the constant Change of 
Air: and that the lower Regions of the Body, and the alimentary Instruments 
and Hypochondres are thereby most shaken and exercised. Next to that, is 
ri ding in a Chaise or Chariot. [And] Walking ( ... ). Next to these are the active 
Games and Sports, such as Hunting, Shooting, Bowls, Bi/liards, Shuttle-cock, 
and the like (1733, p. 180). 
lt is easy to link Cheyne's writings with Hume's Letter to a physician, which openly 
condernns an idle life for being conducive to the condition he complains about (pp. 
17-18). Moreover, Hume endorses the benefits of exercise, especially horseback 
riding and walking (p. 15). 
In addition, Cheyne advises entertaining the mind and diverting it from thoughts 
about rnisfortune and misery in order to avoid anxiety: 
[ ... ] 1 would earnestly recommend to all tho se afflicted with Nerva us 
Distempers, always to have sorne innocent entertaining Amusement to employ 
themselves in, for the Rest of the Day, after they have employed a sufficient 
time upon Exercise, towards the Evening, to prepare them for their Night's 
quiet Rest [ ... ]. Study of difficult ànd intricate Matters will infallibly do Hurt. 
Reading must be light, entertaining, and diverting, as well as Food (1733, pp. 
181-182). 
Cheyne's recommendations of using entertainment to lessen melancholy are echoed 
in Hume's acknowledgement of "[ ... ] that continuai search after amusement in 
gaming, in hunting, in business," which enlivens the spirit and serves as an antidote 
against "the deepest melancholy and despair" (T 2.2.4.4, SBN p. 352). 
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1.4 Closing remarks 
Moderate exercise, harmless amusements, and a light diee8 seem to be the most 
conventional remedies recommended by eighteenth century physicians for treating 
the symptoms of melancholy. Although Cheyne also recommends medicinal 
remedies,29 the most relevant treatments against melancholy have been considered in 
this chapter. 
Hume is unwilling to admit that he suffers from any "lowness of spirits," yet the 
general description of his disease is typical of melancholy, according to eighteenth 
century standards. The causes (abstruse and excessive studies, isolation, idleness, and 
lack of exercise), his hypochondriac symptomatology (scurvy spots, hypersalivation, 
excessive appetite, heart palpitations, bloated stomach, weakness, and lack of 
enthusiasm) and the comprehensive remedies that Hume describes in his Letter to a 
physician (moderation in studying, exercise in the form of regular horseback riding 
and daily walking, a constant and moderate diet, good sleep, business, and 
distractions), are certainly in line with the eighteenth century conception of 
melancholy. 
28 As weil as Arbuthnot, Cheyne also recommends a simple, soft, tender, and easy-to-digest diet to 
help thin and dilute the viscid liquid and obstructions that cause melancholy ( 1733, pp. 159-160). 
29 Summarizing his therapeutic method, Cheyne writes: "What 1 have formerly said about the 
general Cure of Nervous Distempers by a Regimen of Diet, Exercise, and the three Classes of 
Medicines mentioned [ which, correspondingly, have the intention to 1) thin, di lute, and sweeten the 
whole Mass of Fluids, to open the Obstructions and make the Circulation full and free, the 
Perspiration current, and the Secretions flow; 2) to divide, break and dissolve the saline, acrid and 
hard Concretions, generated in the small Vessels; 3) to restore the Tone and e/astick [sic] Force, to 
crisp, wind up, and contract the Fibres of the whole System] is not only the solid Foundation of a 
substantial and lasting Cure, but is also the most effectuai Means for weakening the Symptoms, and 
making their lntervals longer, and without which ali the other Attempts for that Purpose will be 
ineffectual" (1733, p. 205). 
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But Hume mentions neither an excess of black bile nor digestive obstructions as an 
explanation of his distemper. Rather, he talks about a disturbance of the nerves and 
brain as a plausible foundation (Letter to a physician, p. 17). Such an explanation 
seems to correspond with Cullen and Cheyne's above-mentioned contributions to 
eighteenth century medicine. 
Hume's Letter to a physician offers insightful passages about the relation between 
studying excessively and sorne symptoms of melancholy. However, immoderate 
study is not the only trigger for this disease. The subject one studies can also have a 
major emotional impact. In the following chapter, 1 will show how excessive rational 
inquiries and sceptical arguments may be the cause, according to Hume, of a 
profound and complex melancholy. 1 will do this by exploring the link between 
Hume's scepticism and melancholy, as weil as his solution to sceptical melancholy. 
CHAPTERII 
HUME AND THE MELANCHOL Y OF THE SCEPTIC 
In this chapter I will put forward a new reading ofHume's scepticism in the Treatise 
by showing how he connects scepticism with an emotional pathology-melancholy. 
Based on the previous chapter, I will argue that Hume's solution to philosophically-
induced melancholy is based on sorne of the remedies prescribed against melancholy 
in the eighteenth century. I shall also claim that melancholy plays a vital role in 
Hume's philosophical project, as doxastic stability30 is reached through balancing 
melancholy against the love of truth. Understanding the "cure" Hume proposes-the 
moderation of sceptical speculation by rejecting abstruse reasonings-is paramount 
for characterizing the nature of his scepticism, which is a hody debated topic. Finally 
I will claim that the character traits allowing practical and epistemic moderation are 
virtuous by Hume's own standards. 
This chapter is organized in the following way. In section 2.1 I explore Hume's 
investigative journey throughout Book I of the Treatise, in which an initial 
enthusiasm and devotion for the search for truth motivates questioning the faculty to 
make "demonstrative and probable reasonings" (T 1.3.9.19 n. 22, SBN p. 117 n. 22), 
leading the reader into a sceptical trap. In that section I will explain how the 
unfulfilled desire and longing for truth can plunge one into emotional strife. 
While making a detailed examination of Hume's mise en scène of a sceptical crisis, 1 
will claim that the emotional and pathological aspects of Hume's conception play a 
positive role-<me that can save the reader from scepticism regarding common 
beliefs. My analysis shows how the love of truth31 and melancholy can steer one's 
commitment to everyday beliefs in two opposing directions, and how this contrast 
3° Cf. Introduction of this thesis. 
31 Cf. section 2.2 of this thesis. 
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helps to exp lain moderate scepticism. Finally, this section highlights the link 
between Hume's scepticism and the medical conception of melancholy in the 
eighteenth century. 
In section 2.2 I will show how the love of truth is Hume's ruling passion throughout 
Book I of the Treatise. I will exp lain how a deep sceptical cri sis can result from an 
unsatisfied love of truth. Hume's staged melancholic crisis, in the end of Book I, 
serves the purpose of showing how radical doubts, and the loneliness of a 
philosophical quest, trigger feelings of despair, uneasiness, and pessimism. I will 
also expose the dilemma of having to choose between two unreliable methods of 
inquiry (the faculty to make "demonstrative and probable reasonings" and an 
unrestrained imagination) contribute to the loss of hope in attaining the truth. At the 
highpoint of doubt, melancholy acts as a warning sign, forcing one to stop 
questioning certain beliefs. 
In section 2.3 I will argue that Hume's solution to sceptical melancholy consists in 
rejecting abstruse reasonings and regaining certain beliefs through the lively 
impressions, distractions, and company. There is ample evidence in Hume's writings 
showing that he holds the view that a moderate approach to knowledge and 
philosophical inquiry is the best solution to the intellectual deadlock and emotional 
distress to which radical doubt leads. Hume's view is that doxastic stability is 
reached through 1) refraining from seeking the justification of certain fundamental 
beliefs--e.g. in absolute space and time, in the existence of extemal objects, in real 
causation, in immaterial substances, in reason, and in persona} identity-and 2) 
limiting our blind trust in reason. Such stability is attained through balancing two 
emotions: the love oftruth and the aversion to speculative inquiry. 
Section 2.4 portrays the character traits motivating moderate scepticism as desirable 
qualities-because of their association with epistemic and practical advantages. 
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These advantages consist in avoiding error and deception, as well as overcoming the 
emotional pain triggered by radical doubt. 
2.1 Melancholy and the shattering of common life beliefs 
2.1.1 Hume's investigative joumey 
Book I of the Treatise deals with the mechanisms of human understanding, 
particularly with how one acquires knowledge. Hume begins his journey towards 
establishing a science of human nature with the basic premise that there is nothing in 
the mind but perceptions-the immediate objects of the mind, which he divides in 
impressions and ideas (T 1.2.6.7, SBN p. 67). Impressions and ideas are subdivided 
into simple or complex. Simple perceptions are indivisible, while complex 
perceptions are the result of a combination of simple perceptions. The main 
difference between ideas and impressions is that ideas are causally dependent on 
impressions, and not vice versa. In this respect, Hume notes that "[ ... ] all our simple 
ideas proceed, either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent 
impressions" (T 1.1.1.11, SBN pp. 6-7). Another difference is that ideas, being a 
copy of impressions, will usually have different degrees of vivacity-but not of 
quantity and quality-than impressions (T 1.1.7.5, SBN p. 19). 
With this initial assumption in hand, Hume is interested in explaining how one 
acquires sorne of the fundamental ideas-such as space, time, existence of extemal 
objects, causation, immaterial substances, reason, and personal identity--employed 
in metaphysics and in the seemingly most trivial aspects of practicallife. Through his 
inquiry, Hume disco vers that one does not have access to direct impressions of the se 
fundamental ideas. For instance, one may not have an impression corresponding to 
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the idea of causality in objects, but this idea can be formed by an impression 
corresponding to one's revised idea of causality. Hume notes that if all ideas are 
causally dependent on impressions, then the origin of these fundamental ideas is 
unclear because it is not obvious that we can point out the impressions from which 
they are derived. Hume's joumey in the first book of the Treatise then, is motivated 
by the desire to discover the true origin of one's ideas of space, time, existence, 
causation, reason, and personal identity. 
In the conclusion of Book 1 (T 1.4.7.1-15, SBN pp. 263-274), Hume pauses to 
recapitulate the joumey of his inquiry and evaluate his arguments. Hume's gloomy 
approach to his own conclusions is due to the acknowledgement that following the 
faculty to make "demonstrative and probable reasonings" offers no reliable 
justification for human understanding. 
2.1.2 Shattered beliefs 
After rehearsing sceptical arguments about space, time, existence of external objects, 
causation, immaterial substances, reason, and personal identity throughout Book 1 of 
the Treatise, Hume remains unable to exp lain the origin of these notions. This failure 
leaves his desire for knowledge about human nature unsatisfied. This is the source of 
his feelings of despair. 
Hume gives two senses to the word imagination. For him, what we call reason falls 
under one of these senses and, hence, it has to be understood as a specifie form of the 
imaginative activity of the mind. This is based on Hume's distinction between two 
kinds of principles guiding the imagination. Sorne principles are "permanent, 
irresistible, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, 
and from effects to causes," the se consistent and sol id princip les are the foundation 
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of ail human thought and action-what Hume calls reason. Other principles are 
"changeable, weak, and irregular." These latter princip les, says Hume, are avoidable 
and unnecessary to mankind, and they are used in the systems of ancient 
metaphysicians to produce fictions such as "substance and accident" and ail sorts of 
creative activities. (T 1.4.4.1-2, SBN pp. 225-226). When Hume distinguishes reason 
from the imagination, he opposes the latter faculty' s capacity to engage in 
"demonstrative and probable reasonings" (T 1.3.9.19 n. 22, SBN p. 117 n. 22) to 
looser or unregulated forms of association of ideas. 
According to Hume, modem philosophy embraces only the frrst kind of princip les of 
the imagination, or what he calls reason. Modern philosophy, he notes, claims that 
secondary qualities such as "colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold" are 
nothing but impressions of extemal objects in the mind of the observer. He agrees 
that these impressions do not resemble the qualities of the perceived objects due to 
the variation of those impressions while the object remains the same. Such variation 
can take place due to the health and constitution of men as well as the extemal 
situation and position of objects ( e.g. tire comrnunicates an impression of pleasure or 
pain according to its distance in relation to the observer) (T 1.4.4.3-4, SBN p. 226). 
But modern philosophers also claim that there are real or primary qualities of objects 
such as "extension and solidity, with their different mixtures and modifications; 
figure, motion, gravity and cohesion." Hume disagrees with such claims, noting that 
the use of what he calls reason leads one into utter scepticism re garding the existence 
of external objects. He argues that proving the real existence of primary qualities 
alone is impossible because these cannot be perceived without relying on secondary 
qualities, such as "colours, sounds, tastes, and smells" (T 1.4.4.6, SBN p. 228). 
Secondary and sensible qualities are unreliable because they are nothing but 
perceptions or modifications of the mind. They are variable and generally 
uninformative about the perceived object-certain foods may taste different to 
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different persons, according to their state of health. As an exarnple, Hume notes that 
one cannot conceive the solidity of an object without conceiving its extension, which 
in turn cannot be conceived without relying on its secondary qualities, such as 
colour. In other words, one cannot comprehend the idea of solidity in itself, without 
reference to the secondary qualities of objects. But secondary qualities are unreliable, 
so primary qualities are as unreliable as secondary qualities in knowing the real 
existence of objects. In conclusion, says Hume, there are no grounds to prove the 
existence of objects by using reason alone (T 1.4.4.5-15, SBN pp. 227-231 ). 
Hume argues that one can believe in the existence of extemal objects thanks to either 
"reason alone" or the imagination. But his sceptical arguments show that reason 
alone is insufficient to justify such belief. Even though, says Hume, past experience 
allows one to grasp the conjunction of objects, and the habit of such repeated 
experience conduces one to expect the sarne behaviour in the future, neither 
experience nor habit are founded on what he calls reason (T 1.4.2.47, SBN p. 212; T 
1.4.2.54, SBN p. 216). Only the vivacity of one's ideas-not what Hume caUs 
reason-can aid in thinking from causes and effects, (T 1.4.2.21-22, SBN pp. 197-
198) and believing in the existence of extemal objects that are no longer present (T 
1.4.2.14, SBN p. 193). Therefore, one is left with the imagination in order to justify 
the existence of extemal objects. But the imagination also seems an unreliable 
foundation for knowledge. So one must choose between "a false reason and none at 
all" (T 1.4.7.7, SBN p. 268), which is very frustrating. 
Hume shows how consolation is hard to achieve after grasping the dissatisfying 
conclusions that the love of truth has led one to discover. The expressive force with 
which Hume articulates such state of despondency is worth citing at length: 
My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. 
The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ 
in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of 
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amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and 
makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which 1 am at present, rather 
than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. 
This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy; and as 'tis usual 
for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; 1 cannot forbear feeding my 
despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present subject 
fumishes me with in such abundance (T 1.4.7.1, SBN p. 264). 
In this confessional passage32 Hume is aware that melancholy incites one to wallow 
in one's own misery, making it hard to avoid a despondent and solitary state.33 For 
Hume, all the human faculties are insufficient to grasp the truth. Moreover, these 
discoveries put a temporary halt to any project of contributing to the understanding 
of human nature.34 In close connection with the expression of his disappointment 
towards his intellectual faculties, the way Hume understands the operations of the 
mind reinforces his discouragement: 
No wonder a principle so inconstant and fallacious [the imagination] shou'd 
lead us into errors, when implicitely follow'd (as it must be) in all its 
32 The passage shows the use of a Iiterary style fil led with pathos that communicates the sadness 
and despair of a frustrated intellect. Y et, the invention of such style cannot be attributed to Hume. 
According to Stephen Menn (2003), there is evidence of an established genre of confessional 
autobiographies in the literary tradition that originates in Galen's writings and where the 
autobiographical content is adapted to the demands of the context and is used in the search for method 
ofinquiry. On the basis ofMenn's work, I believe that Hume's confessional style in T 1.4.7 (SBN pp. 
263-274) is reminiscent of other writings of philosophical discovery written as confessional 
autobiographies, such as Saint Augustine's Confessions ([397-400] 1991) and Descartes' Discourse on 
the Method ([1637] 1965). 
33 In connection with Hume's melancholic personae, Robert Fogelin (2009) offers an interesting 
study of Hume's sceptical crisis. He identifies four different epistemological voices, or characters, 
throughout Hume's Treatise: The confident, the melancholic, the modest, and the vulgar or common 
sense voice. Fogelin argues that ali of these narrative characters genuinely belong to Hume and that 
there is a continuous plot, within the Treatise, throughout which each epistemological voice is 
developed. 
34 In my opinion, Hume's temporary step back from philosophical inquiry is consistent with the 
development of his philosophical project. In relation to this, Robert Fogelin ( 1985) claims that 
Hume's scepticism is not only compatible with his "science of human nature," but that his sceptical 
arguments are entrenched in a naturalistic program of research. Fogelin sees Hume as a moderate 
sceptic and he makes an effort to strike a balance between Hume's radical scepticism and his 
naturalism. The work of David Fate Norton ( 1994, 2002) runs along similar interpretative tines. 
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variations. 'Tis this principle, which makes us reason from causes and effects; 
and 'tis the same principle, which convinces us of the continu'd existence of 
external objects, when absent from the senses. But tho' these two operations be 
equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in sorne circumstances 
they are directly contrary, nor is it possible for us to reason justly and regularly 
from causes and effects, and at the same time be lieve the continu' d existence 
of matter.[ 35] How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of 
them shaH we prefer? (T 1.4.7.4, SBN pp. 265-266). 
In this passage, Hume explains that human reason is based on a fallacious and 
contradictory principle. The imagination, which is a fundamental aspect of 
reasoning, can also lead to errors. This problem is relevant because it adds to the 
fallibility that Hume discovers in reason, which in turn boosts his despondency. 
Other aspects of human understanding are also exposed as discouraging. Hume 
mentions that the principle, which connects a phenomenon with its cause,36 does not 
rest on the perceived relation of the objects but, rather, on the inquirer's habit of 
observing this relation and his expectation to perceive the same relation. So, the 
belief of causality between objects is acquired by an act of the senses and custom, 
instead of what Hume calls reason. Hume questions how far one should yield to the 
imagination, since there is no other justification for one's beliefs concerning the 
princip le connecting cause and effect. He concludes that neither of the two forms of 
the imagination (T 1.4.1.3-10, SBN pp. 181-185) are reliable sources for human 
understanding (T 1.4.7.5-7, SBN pp. 266-268). The view ofthese limitations in what 
Hume calls reason leaves one, or so Hume believes, without a reliable guide to 
validate knowledge, plunging one into a dilemma as to which course of action to 
follow: 
35 Hume re fers here to the contradiction between the absurdity of asserting the existence of objects 
without relying on the impressions oftheir sensible qualities, such as their colour, sound, taste, etc.-
impressions wholly dependent on the observer-and the feeling the observer gets from his senses that 
external objects exist independently (T 1.4.5.15, SBN p. 231). 
36 For an explanation ofHume's relation of causation cf. T 1.3.2.1-8, SBN pp. 73-76. 
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Shali we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no re fin' d or elaborate 
reasoning is ever to be receiv'd? Consider weli the consequences of such a 
principle. By this means y ou eut off entirely ali science and philosophy: Y ou 
proceed upon one singular quality of the imagination, and by a parity of reason 
must embrace all of them: And you expressly contradict yourself; since this 
maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning, which will be allow'd to be 
sufficiently refin'd and metaphysical. What party, then, shali we choose among 
these difficulties? If we embrace this principle, and condemn ali refin'd 
reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of 
these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, 
therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all (T 1.4.7.7, 
SBN p. 268). 
However, there is a positive si de to this seemingly adverse disco very. Nature37 cures 
one of "philosophical melancholy and delirium" by relaxing one's sceptical 
inclinations or by giving a lively impression to one's senses. lndeed, Hume explains 
that vivid distractions, such as dining, board games, good company, and 
conversation, allow one to forget the despairing outcome of an unsatisfied love of 
tru th: 
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these 
clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this 
philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or 
by sorne avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all 
these chimeras. 1 dîne, 1 play a game of back-gammon, 1 converse, and am 
merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, 1 
wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and 
ridiculous, that 1 cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther (T 
1.4. 7.8-9, SBN p. 269). 
37 In Book Ill ofthe Treatise, Hume distinguishes between several senses of the term nature and he 
underlies how equivocal this term can be. He highlights three different definitions of the word nature: 
as opposed to miracles, as opposed to rare and unusual, and as opposed to artifice (T 3.1.2.7-9, SBN 
p. 473-475). By the term nature I mean the innate or essential qualities ofthe mind that produce belief 
due to lively impressions. In relation to my interpretation of the term, Hume writes: "'Tis happy, 
therefore, that nature breaks the force of ali sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having 
any considerable influence on the understanding" (T 1.4.1.12, SBN p. 187). 
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Keeping in mind Hume's approach, one can appreciate the link between the 
eighteenth century usually prescribed remedies against melancholy, such as 
company, business, and diversion, and Hume's recognition that amusements and 
lively impressions can save one from sceptical melancholy. Because they are 
unpleasant, the uneasiness and emotional pain associated with sceptical melancholy 
push one away from abstruse reasonings. This repugnancy towards fruitless 
speculations-and the engagement in amusements and lively impressions-saves 
one from loneliness and gloom, and allows one to experience pleasure in life by 
interacting with others. 
Hume acknowledges that nature forces one to engage in the common affairs of life 
and hold ordinary beliefs such as the existence of objects. Y et, while enjoying the 
pleasure of common life, memories of past abstract philosophical inquiries may arise 
in the mind. By temporarily rejecting abstruse reasonings and giving in to the lively 
impressions of common life, Hume adopts a moderate form of scepticism (T 
1.4.7.10, SBN pp. 269-270), which contrasts with his own interpretation of the 
radical scepticism of the Pyrrhonists38 (T 1.4.1.7, SBN p. 183; Abstract 27, SBN p. 
657). This yielding to lively sensations, Hume argues, is consistent with his 
scepticism: 
These are the sentiments of my spleen and indolence; and indeed I must 
confess that philosophy has nothing to oppose to them, and expects a victory 
more from the returns of a good-humour'd disposition, than from the force of 
reason and conviction. In ali the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our 
scepticism. If we believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because 
it costs us too much pains to think otherwise. Nay if we are philosophers, it 
ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we 
38 In a subsequent work, the first Enquiry, Hume will openly acknowledge the link between 
Pyrrhonism and a moderate kind of scepticism, as he writes: "There is, indeed, a more mitigated 
scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, 
be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in sorne 
measure, corrected by common sense and retlection" (EHU 12.24). 
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feel to the employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively, and 
mixes itself with sorne propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, 
it never can have any title to operate upon us (T 1.4.7.11, SBN p. 270). 
Don Garrett reads this passage as proposing an epistemic principle, which he caUs 
the "Title Principle" (1997, pp. 234-235). The principle does not altogether forbid 
abstruse reasonings. Rather, it allows refined philosophical speculations only to the 
extent that one dwells on topics that naturally attract one's interest. This principle 
allows one to refuse the products of the imagination that are "changeable, weak, and 
irregular" because--except in the case of extemal objects-nature dispels these 
suggestions. One can assent to the lively impressions of the imagination that are 
"permanent, irresistible, and universal" because their force cannot be destroyed by 
abstruse and refined reasonings. One may accept these beliefs, even though they 
offer no convincing explanation when analysed through reason alone. 
On the other hand, this principle says that one must reject the type of abstruse 
reasoning that subverts itself, goes against one's interests, and is incompatible with 
nature. According to Garrett, following this principle allows one to avoid the 
dilemma of having to choose between "a false reason and none at all" (T 1.4.7.7, 
SBN p. 268). 1 agree with Garrett and think that his interpretation constitutes an 
elegant solution to the problem of having to choose between two conflicting aspects 
ofhuman understanding. 
lndeed, Hume shows that the love of truth may pull one back into philosophical 
speculations, albeit not exactly under the same conditions as before. He claims that 
one can retum to philosophical inquiries after having experienced lively impressions. 
After having been amused and enjoyed the company of others, it is fine to indulge 
one's curiosity and go back to abstruse inquiries. These philosophical investigations 
will not be the same type as the one performed before, because the inquirer would 
have already experienced the frustration accompanying unanswered sceptical 
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arguments and discovered the way to avoid the dilemma of having to choose 
between "a false reason and none at all" (T 1.4.7.7, SBN p. 268). 
For Hume, one's curiosity may be triggered by not being able to explain conflicting 
values. By this 1 mean the incapacity to explain, for instance, why 1 approve one 
object over another (T 1.4.7.12, SBN pp. 270-271). Such lack of an explanation can 
be a source of uneasiness, 39 which is explained by the contrast of a natural 
inclination to approve, or find more beautiful, one object over another. Hume 
mentions that he is interested in understanding the passions that govem him, the 
principles of moral good and evil, and the nature and foundation of govemment.40 
Moreover, he expresses that no other endeavour can give him more pleasure than the 
pursuit of knowledge. The reason for this, says Hume, are naturally sprung feelings 
compelling him to con tri bute to the instruction of mankind and acquiring a name by 
his discoveries. Such pursuit is to be followed by him through harmless 
philosophy-as opposed to the more dangerous religion or superstition-which 
limits itself to the study of phenomena of the visible world and which only generates 
"mild and moderate sentiments"41 (T 1.4.7.12-13, SBN pp. 270-272). 
Hume also notes that not all persons are inclined to inquire about phenomena, either 
visible or invisible. He notes that "many honest gentlemen" limit their lives to 
business and amusement-without the need to pursue any philosophical, religious, or 
39 Louis Loeb (2002) offers a close examination of Hume's treatment of uneasiness when there is 
contlict between beliefs. For particular instances of the use of the term "uneasy" cf. T 1.4.1.10, 
1.4.2.37, and 1.4.7.12 SBN pp. 185, 205, and 271; for "uneasiness" cf. T 1.4.2.37, 2.3.10.12, SBN pp. 
205, 453; for "stability" cf. T 1.3.11.9, SBN p. 127; for "steadiness" cf. T 1.3.7.7, 1.3.12.6, SBN pp. 
629, 133. 
40 Hume explores these subjects in Books II and III of his Treatise. 
41 ln the Natural History of Religion (NHR 11.5), Hume compares the harmless pretentions of 
philosophy with the violence resulting from the corruption of scholastic religion. See also NHR 15.3, 
where Hume praises the "calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy" in contrast with the dangers of 
superstition. 
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superstitious speculations about the world-and they do well to keep themselves to 
their domestic affairs and recreations. Although Hume does not explicitly mention 
why these persons do well to keep themselves within the sphere of common life, 1 
suppose that a curiosity or need to speculate beyond common life is a sort of 
weakness that sorne, philosophers as well as religious and superstitious persons, are 
passionately driven to. Hume says that he wishes he could communicate "a share of 
this gross earthy mixture" to founders of systems, whose "fiery particles," or what 1 
interpret as wild imaginations42, need to be moderated (T 1.4.7.14, SBN p. 272). 
Interestingly, Norton and Norton mention that Hume's reference to "earthy mixture" 
is an allusion to the four elements that form the ancient theory of humours or 
temperaments43 (2000, p. 489). 
On the other hand, says Hume, during the last two thousand years philosophy has 
regrettably allowed an unrestrained use of the imagination, which has often resulted 
in the creation of many chimerical systems whose topics and ideas are removed from 
practice and experience. In opposition to this imaginary way of doing philosophy, 
Hume aims at creating steady philosophical principles, free from chimerical 
speculations, which will stand the test of careful examination. He mentions that if he 
can furnish such steady principles, he thinks he will contribute to human knowledge. 
The hope of doing so saves him from the despondent mood that he experiences from 
time to time. Hume invites those readers who are inclined to philosophize to follow 
him. This does not mean, however, that people cannot be taught to be philosophers, 
but that only those with the appropriate disposition will benefit from following 
Hume's speculations. 
42 1 use the term "wild imaginations" here because in the following sentence of Hume's passage he 
refers to the rote of "warm imagination" in philosophy and the limited place it ought to have in a 
philosophical system (T 1.4.7.14, SBN p. 272). In this context, the term "wild imagination" is used to 
make a contrast with a moderate use of imagination. 
43 For more about the theory of humours or temperaments see section 1.2.1 of this thesis. 
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Hume also says that the true sceptic probes the world without becoming 
overwhelmed: 
If the reader finds himself in the same easy disposition, let him follow me in 
my future speculations. If not, let him follow his inclination, and wait the 
returns of application and good humour. The conduct of a man, who studies 
philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly sceptical than that of one, 
who feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so over-whelm'd with doubts 
and scruples, as totally to reject it. A true sceptic will be diffident of his 
philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never 
refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of 
them {T 1.4.7.14, SBN p. 273). 
Reading this passage it may seem odd that Hume thinks a sceptic can have 
convictions since, by his own definition, a sceptic holds that all is uncertain (T 
1.4.1.7, SBN p. 183). But 1 take Hume is referring in the above-quoted passage to a 
moderate kind of scepticism, which allows assenting to lively impressions under 
circumstances where appealing to sceptical arguments may seem forced and 
unnatural.44 Earlier in the Treatise, Hume says that if one holds the beliefs that tire 
warms and water refreshes it is only because to think otherwise is very difficult (T 
1.4.7.11, SBN p. 270) and in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion one of his 
characters, Cleanthes, says that the task of any reasonable sceptic is to "reject 
abstruse, remote and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain 
instincts of nature [45]; and to assent, where-ever any reasons strike him with so full a 
force, that he cannot, without the greatest violence, prevent it" (DNR 3.7). 
44 This approach is not in conflict with that of Sextus and the Pyrrhonists, who also allow beliefs 
that are prompted by mere appearances. Cf. section 1.2.1 of this thesis. 
45 By the term nature 1 understand the innate or essential qualities of the mind that produce belief 
due to lively impressions. See note 37 of this thesis. 
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Although Cleanthes' voice may not express Hume's beliefs, it offers an approach to 
scepticism that has certain resemblance with Hume's above-quoted claim (T 1.4.7.14, 
SBN p. 273). 
Also in support of my reading of Hume's moderate scepticism, he says that it is 
acceptable and desirable both to engage in abstruse reasonings involving sceptical 
princip les and to express non-dogmatic certainty, about particular things, at 
particular moments "by the present view of the object" (T 1.4.7.15, SBN pp. 273-
274), which is a reminder of the importance that Hume gives to the natural tendency 
to accept evident matters. 
2.1.3 The link between Hume's scepticism and the medical tradition on melancholy 
Throughout the first chapter of this thesis I've shown that strong disappointments, 
abstruse and excessive studies, isolation, and lack of amusements and physical 
activity are sorne of the causes that eighteenth-century physicians associate with 
melancholy. Interestingly, ali these elements are present, either explicitly or 
implicitly in Hume's discussion of his philosophical investigations in the conclusion 
of Book 1 of his Treatise. In this section 1 show that Hume's approach to scepticism 
has a crucial resemblance with sorne of the remedies prescribed against melancholy 
in the eighteenth century. Understanding this is paramount to unlocking Hume's 
views on the connection between scepticism and melancholy. 
The implications of the scepticism described in T 1.4.7 (SBN pp. 263-274) are 
problematic because they point out the difficulty of justifying any claim to 
knowledge. They also provoke a profound physical and emotional impact, 
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reminiscent of Hume's Letter to a physician.46 The conclusion of Book 1 of the 
Treatise portrays the mechanism by which someone can plummet into a painful 
emotional state due to an unsatisfied love of truth. If further explored, the concluding 
remarks of Book 1 help to better understand the nature ofHume's scepticism. Hume's 
findings appear to create a major setback in the endeavour to establish a science of 
human nature.47 Indeed, it seems impossible to validate the authenticity of one's own 
beliefs, when the evidence for them stems either from the imagination or an abstruse 
reasoning that subverts itself. 48 
Immoderate grief stemming from the loss or longing of something beloved or a 
strong disappointment, claims Mandeville, can be a trigger for melancholy.49 Clearly, 
Hume's account of melancholy in the conclusion of Book 1 of his Treatise is 
triggered by a strong disappointment, as he faces the dilemma of having to choose 
between two contradictory sources of knowledge-the imagination (or loose 
imagination) and what he calls reason (or rule-govemed imagination). 5° Grief also 
figures amongst Cheyne's long list of symptoms of melancholy.51 The interpretation 
that 1 suggest is that, for Hume, it is the disappointment of unfulfilled expectations of 
grasping the truth that may drive a curious and intellectually inclined person towards 
a state of despondency. 1 suggest that the discoveries about the operation of the 
human mind exposed throughout Book 1 of the Treatise, and the difficulty m 
justifying certain beliefs, are the elements that constitute Hume's sceptical crisis. 
46 Cf. section 1.1 of this thesis. 
47 In contrast with my reading, Baier ( 1991) downp1ays the importance of Hume's scepticism. Her 
view on Hume's epistemo1ogy in the Treatise is that he is not a sceptic, but that he builds a more solid 
epistemological and moral system by questioning the prevailing knowledge paradigms of his time (i.e. 
rationalism) and constructing a new "scientific" approach to mental phenomena. 
48 Cf. section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
49 Cf. section 1.3.4 of this thesis. 
5
° Cf. section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
51 Cf. section 1.3.5 of this thesis. 
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Early works on melancholy also associate it with constant thinking and worrying, as 
Rufus of Ephesus has noted.52 The excessive intention or fixation of the mind on a 
single thing, sometimes observed in studio us persons, described by Arbuthnot, 53 as 
well as the fixation of the mind on one object, according to Johnson's definition of 
melancholy,54 is relevant to establish another link between the medical texts of the 
eighteenth century and Hume's sceptical melancholy. To see the connection, one 
must consider that Hume's philosophical efforts revolve around the idea of 
establishing a science of human nature, which he intensely pursues as it is shown in 
the dramatic conclusion of Book 1 of the Treatise. 
As it will be explained in the following section, the love of truth plays a crucial role 
in motivating the avid intellectual to pursue her work. Hume's account of sceptical 
melancholy is reminiscent of a medical tradition of conceiving melancholy as a 
disease of frustrated intellectuals. The sceptical arguments that Hume develops 
throughout Book 1 of the Treatise come to a crescendo by the end of said book. He 
conveys that the strength and scope of such sceptical arguments can catch hold in a 
very compelling manner. Despair, solitude, and sadness may be triggered by an 
unsatisfied love of truth. Such frustration stems from the disappointment that the 
expectations of the fruits of abstruse reasonings do not live up to one's desires. 
Other important aspects of Hume's portrayal of sceptical melancholy are the lack of 
company and the influence that others may have in dispelling bouts of philosophical 
despondency. In Book II of his Treatise, Hume mentions how sorne claim that losing 
hold of extemal objects can be a cause of despair and he agrees that the mind is 
inadequate to entertain itself, which explains the constant search for amusements in 
52 Cf. section 1.2.1 of this thesis. 
53 Cf. section 1.3.3 of this thesis. 
54 Cf. section 1.3 of this thesis. 
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other objects. Those objects excite the mind in a vigorous way that could never take 
place in solitary and quiet moments. 
Hume says that, of all amusements, induding gaming, hunting, and business, nothing 
excites and agitates the spirits as much as company can-that is, the communication 
of sentiments with another rational being (T 2.2.4.4, SBN pp. 352-353). In relation to 
loneliness, the history of the concept of melancholy shows how for sorne medieval 
physicians, such as Constantinus Africanus, 55 religious and solitary people are prone 
to this disease, and how solitude is a cause of melancholy for which occupations, 
distractions, employment, physical labour, and pleasant company are the best 
remedies (Burton, Anatomy 1.2.2.6). 
Analyzing the eighteenth-century conception of melancholy, particularly the writings 
of Burton and Mandeville that refer to the avid intellectual, contributes to a better 
understanding of Hume's sceptical despondency. Such conception proves useful in 
grasping both the emotional state of the sceptical philosopher and the nature of 
Hume's own scepticism. But in order to further understand Hume's conception on the 
subject of sceptical melancholy, one needs to pay doser attention to the driving force 
of all philosophical inquiries. 
2.2 The love of truth 
Hume shows that the unfulfilled pursuit of knowledge-the love of truth-may 
plunge one into a profound sceptical crisis. Based on my interpretation of Hume's 
observations, 1 daim that only those who possess the right combination of character 
traits-and are able to develop these traits under the appropriate circumstances-will 
55 Cf. section 1.2.2 of this thesis. 
58 
be strongly driven by the passion for "curiosity, or the love oftruth" (T 2.3.10.1-12, 
SBN pp. 448-454). These persons will be prone to inquire about the true nature of 
things and sorne may even adopt a strong sceptical attitude that is conducive to 
sceptical melancholy. 
Hume notoriously claims that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions" (T 2.3.3.4, SBN p. 415). According to him, what he calls reason, alone, 
cannot motivate any action; passion also plays a fundamental role in influencing 
one's behaviour (T 2.3.3.1-6, SBN pp. 413-415; T 2.3.5.1, SBN p. 422; T 3.2.1.16-
19, SBN pp. 483-484). Book II of the Treatise explores the development and 
mechanism of the passions, which for Hume are secondary impressions, or 
impressions of reflection. 56 
In the concluding section of Book II (T 2.3.10.1-12, SBN pp. 448-454), Hume 
exp lains a very peculiar passion, that of curiosity, or the love of truth, which does not 
seem to fit squarely within his categorization of direct and indirect passions. 
Hume distinguishes between "direct" or "indirect" passions. Direct passions are those 
that occur forthwith from pain or pleasure, such as "desire, aversion, grief,joy, hope, 
fear, despair and security" (T 2.1.1.3-4, SBN pp. 276-277) and are directed to what 
causes them. On the other hand, indirect passions, such as "pride, humility, love, and 
hatred" also have their origin on pleasure and pain but are always directed to persons 
(either oneself or others). Hume calls this mechanism the "double relation of 
impressions and ideas" and he exp lains it succinct! y in this way: "Men are vain of the 
beauty of their country, of their county, of their parish. Here the idea of beauty 
plainly produces a pleasure. This pleasure is related to pride. The object or cause of 
this pleasure is, by the supposition, related to self, or the object of pride. By this 
56 For a summary of Hume's characterization of impressions and ideas, see the opening paragraphs 
of section 2.1.1 of this thesis. 
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double relation of impressions and ideas, a transition 1s made from the one 
impression to the other" (T 2.1.9.6-7, SBN p. 306). 
Evidence that the love of truth does not fit ni cely in Hume's classification is not only 
found in the complexity with which Hume describes curiosity or the love of truth, 
but also in the fact that he dedicates a separate section to this passion (T 2.3.10, SBN 
pp. 448-454). Moreover, Hume explicitly acknowledges the odd features of curiosity, 
or the love of truth by saying: "'Tis an affection of so peculiar a kind, that 'twoud 
have been impossible to have treated of it under any of those heads [i.e. direct and 
indirect passions], which we have examin'd, without danger of obscurity and 
confusion" (T 2.3.10.1, SBN p. 448). The love of truth plays a fundamental role in 
motivating Hume's inquiry concerning human nature, so perhaps this is also why he 
dedicates a separate section toits examination. 
For Hume, the love of truth is "the first source of all our enquiries." This claim is 
significant because it suggests that a passion for discovering the unknown is a 
necessary condition for taking any inquisitive action. According to Hume there are 
two kinds of truths: Those consisting in the "proportions of ideas" (such as 
mathematical truths attained through reasoning), or those in "the conformity of our 
ideas of objects to their real existence" (such as the simple comparison oftwo bodies 
by measurements, as opposed to the more challenging comparison made through 
mathematical reasoning) (T 2.3.10.2, SBN p. 448). 
Now, Hume daims that the first kind of truth alone is insufficient to provide 
considerable pleasure. In spite of involving a certain level of genius and effort, it 
lacks the importance of applying the discovery to do something useful (T 2.3.1 0.4, 
SBN pp. 449-450). In line with the aforementioned examples, mathematical truths 
per se are not as pleasurable as when they are applied to help solve a concrete 
problem or building an ingenious deviee. The practical application of mathematical 
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truths shows their usefulness and importance. In sum, any pleasure derived from the 
love of truth involves two necessary and sufficient elements: The exercise of 
intelligence and the prospect of grasping or making a useful disco very. 
Hume mentions that a passion for "curiosity, or the love of truth" can be explained 
by the pleasure derived from the action of the mind in difficult and chalienging tasks. 
Such claim explains why an easy inteliectual task cannot provide any considerable 
pleasure. Y et, not ali difficult and chalienging tasks produce pleasure. The end result 
must promise either to be useful or important, or provide the lover of truth with 
something to be proud of. The utility, importance, or the recognition gained by the 
goal being sought is crucial to keeping one's attention and appealing to continue an 
inteliectual pursuit. 
With this approach in mind, Hume exp lains the mechanism of curiosity, or the love 
of truth, in two emblematic passages. The first one compares philosophy to hunting: 
To illustrate ali this by a similar instance, 1 shall observe, that there cannot be 
two passions more nearly resembling each other, than those of hunting and 
philosophy, whatever disproportion may at first sight appear betwixt them. 'Tis 
evident, that the pleasure of hunting consists in the action of the mind and 
body; the motion, the attention, the difficulty, and the uncertainty. 'Tis evident 
likewise, that these actions must be attended with an idea of utility, in order to 
their having any effect upon us (T 2.3.10.8, SBN p. 451). 
One may rightly object that hunting, a leisure activity reserved for the eighteenth-
century upper classes, is far from being useful or important. How can the 
leisureliness of hunting be related to the hard and abstruse thinking of the scholar 
who spends his days confined in a study room? Moreover, how can the joy 
associated with the discovery of scientific or philosophical truths be compared to the 
mundane pleasure of chasing down and killing a beast? 
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Keeping in mind Hume's relaxed approach towards knowledge is crucial to 
understanding his motivation in comparing the leisurely activity of hunting with the 
apparently solemn endeavour ofphilosophizing. As mentioned earlier,57 near the end 
of the conclusion of Book 1, Hume mentions the careless manner of a philosopher 
that, amidst all the seriousness and importance of his endeavour, takes his task light-
heartedly: 
If the reader finds himself in the same easy disposition, let him follow me in 
my future speculations. If not, let him follow his inclination, and wait the 
returns of application and good humour. The conduct of a man, who studies 
philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly sceptical than that of one, 
who feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so over-whelm'd with doubts 
and scruples, as totally to reject it. A true sceptic will be diffident of his 
philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never 
refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of 
them (T 1.4.7.14, SBN p. 273). 
For Hume, a philosophical quest involving a playful and careless engagement with 
the pursuit of truth is the rightly sceptical standpoint. 1 believe that Hume is here 
referring to a moderate kind of scepticism, which allows assenting to lively 
impressions under circumstances where appealing to sceptical arguments may seem 
forced and unnatural. 58 Opposed to such standpoint is the solemn philosopher who 
discards all philosophical pursuits due to the extreme doubts and worries they 
provoke. 
In a different passage, Hume compares philosophy to gaming, where players are not 
only interested in the prospect of profits, but also in the entertainment and excitement 
derived from gaming itself. Hume's comparison shows the ludic aspect of engaging 
with the pursuit of truth: 
57 Cf. section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
58 For a more developed explanation of my interpretation conceming the claim that Hume is 
advocating a moderate kind ofscepticism, cf. section 2.1.2 ofthis thesis. 
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If we want another parallel to these affections, we may consider the passion of 
gaming, which affords a pleasure from the same principles as hunting and 
philosophy. It has been remark'd, that the pleasure of gaming arises not from 
interest alone; since many leave a sure gain for this entertainment: Neither is it 
deriv'd from the game alone; since the same persons have no satisfaction, 
when they play for nothing: But proceeds from both these causes united, tho' 
separately they have no effect. 'Tis here, as in certain chymical preparations, 
where the mixture of two clear and transparent liquids produces a third, which 
is opaque and colour'd (T 2.3.10.9, SBN p. 452). 
Again, sagacity and light-heartedness are present in this example. But no game 
would engage one's attention without the prospect of winning or losing something. 
As that of any avid philosopher, the behaviour of an eager player is guided by a 
strong passion. The passion of gaming causes the player to search an elusive gain at 
the risk of loosing something, while the love of truth motivates the activity of the 
philosopher. In the case of the avid garner, the losses are normally monetary. In the 
case of the philosopher, the things at stake are the youth, health, and money he must 
invest in attaining the truth. Indeed, Hume acknowledges that a commitment to 
philosophy is a risky gamble: "[M]any philosophers have consum'd their time, have 
destroy'd their health, and neglected their fortune, in the search of such truths, as 
they esteem' d important and useful to the world" (T 2.3 .1 0.4, SBN p. 450). 
Section 1.1 of this thesis explored how Hume experienced physical and mental 
troubles due to his initially excessive love of truth. The symptoms that Hume 
describes in his Letter to a physician may be linked to what he later writes in the 
Treatise, regarding the unpleasant emotional symptoms caused by an excessive and 
unsatisfied love of truth. In this respect, his biography may have influenced his 
philosophical conception of sceptical melancholy. 
Moreover, there is a clear parallel between what Hume says about the perils ofbeing 
carried away by a passion for knowledge and what Robert Burton says in the section 
of his Anatomy dedicated to explaining "Love of learning, or overmuch Study." In 
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that section, Burton writes, in regards to lovers of truth, that there is "[n]o labour in 
the world like unto study. It may be, their temperature [sic] will not endure it, but 
striving to be excellent to know all, they lose health, wealth, wit, life, and all" 
(Anatomy 1.2.3.5). 
But explaining the love of truth is not sufficient for fully understanding its role in 
forging Hume's moderate scepticism; the origin of such a passion must also be 
accounted for. An answer may be found by taking a closer look at the character traits 
triggering curiosity. 
2.2.1 The origin ofthe love oftruth 
How can the origin of curiosity be accounted for? I interpret Hume's theory of the 
passions as suggesting that there may be certain natural character traits, such as 
attentiveness, ambition, and inquisitiveness,59 which are conducive to developing the 
passion of curiosity or the love of truth. These character traits are inherent to their 
possessor and cannot be leamed, acquired, or controlled. Given the appropriate 
environmental circumstances, the possessor of the appropriate combination of 
character traits will be predisposed towards a contemplative and inquisitive 
attitude-a passion for truth and knowledge. In sorne persons, such passion, if 
carried too far, may develop into a thorough sceptical attitude conducive to sceptical 
melancholy. 
Nothing besides the search for truth would provide a curious person, under the 
appropriate circumstances, with the kind of pleasure that this passion naturally 
59 This list of character traits is not exhaustive. 
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induces one to pursue. As mentioned earlier,60 Hume believes that the main motive 
for any action is passion, not what he calls reason. He also claims, in contrast with 
numerous ancient and modem views, that reason a/one is unable to govem one's 
passions (T 2.3.3.1-10, SBN pp. 413-418; T 2.3.8.13, SBN pp. 437-438; T 3.3.1.18, 
SBN pp. 583-584). More particularly, conceming the love oftruth, Hume writes: 
1 cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of 
moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of govemment, and the cause of 
those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govem me. 1 am 
uneasy to think 1 approve of one object, and disapprove of another; call one 
thing beautiful, and another deform' d; decide conceming truth and falshood, 
reason and folly, without knowing upon what principles 1 proceed. 1 am 
concem'd for the condition of the leamed world, which lies under such a 
deplorable ignorance in all these particulars. 1 feel an ambition to arise in me of 
contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my 
inventions and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present 
disposition; and shou'd 1 endeavour to banish them, by attaching myselfto any 
other business or diversion, ljèel 1 shou'd be a loser in point ofpleasure; and 
this is the origin of my philosophy (T 1.4.7.12, SBN p. 257). 
In this passage, Hume is acknowledging that one may not help feeling a strong need 
to understand human nature and contribute to human knowledge. He describes a 
compelling desire to know why and how one makes moral evaluations, why there are 
govemments and laws, and the nature of their role in human life. He mentions the 
uneasiness of not knowing the proper foundation for valuing one object over another, 
and the proper justification for calling something true or false. 
More important! y, this passage illustrates how the passion of curiosity may compel 
one to reflect upon the motivation for rational inquiry. Hume shows that answering 
these questions can fulfil one's ambition to contribute to human progress, an 
accomplishment that could make one feel proud. Hume also recognizes that there 
6
° Cf. beginning of section 2.2 ofthis thesis. 
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may be no other activity in the world that one would rather do than to continue with 
a philosophical inquiry, fuelled by a passion for truth. 
The role that the love of truth and melancholy have in the development of scepticism 
can be explained as follows. The pleasure of the prospect of knowing the truth 
motivates the process of rational in quiry. However, wh en no significant progress has 
been accomplished in satisfying curiosity, the pain and uneasiness associated with 
ignorance push the inquirer into an abyss of doubt. 
Curiosity, or the love of truth is, thus, a necessary condition for the development of a 
sceptical outlook. Without the passion of curiosity, there is no motivation for asking 
penetrating questions and dogmatic beliefs remain unchallenged. The link between 
curiosity and scepticism should be no surprise. Traditionally, a sceptic is not a person 
who questions beliefs for the mere sake of doubting, but an inquirer whose curiosity 
prevents him from accepting dogmatic answers.61 
Finally, it should be noted that Hume's conception of sceptical melancholy does not 
portray this condition as widespread. Only those who have a natural passion for the 
love of truth, and who develop such passion thanks to the appropriate circumstances, 
may encounter the uneasiness of sceptical melancholy when their love of truth is 
unfulfilled. 62 
61 The Greek verb "sképtomai" means "to inquire." Etymologically, the term "sceptic" can be 
interpreted as "inquirer." Cf. Klein (2011). 
62 Although the love of truth is a necessary condition for the development of a sceptical outlook, 
this does not mean that scepticism, or moderate scepticism, are the only outcomes of this passion. For 
an acknowledgement of alternative developments to the love oftruth cf. section 2.3.2 ofthis thesis. 
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2.3 Hume's solution to sceptical melancholy 
In this section I claim that melancholy plays a vital role in Hume's philosophical 
project, as doxastic stability-an equilibrium between conflicting beliefs-is reached 
through a balancing act between this passion and the love of truth. The tension 
between these two passions involves a tension between conflicting beliefs because 
Hume associates the love of truth with the pursuit of knowledge through the use of 
reason, white linking melancholy with a loss of hope in attaining knowledge. Hume 
shows that a cautious approach to knowledge can enable one to reap the greatest 
practical and epistemic advantages without becoming paralyzed by a sceptical crisis. 
Moreover, he shows that one may learn to live through such crisis by temporarily 
rejecting abstruse reasonings and reaching doxastic stability. 
Initially, the love of truth motivates one to inquire about the mechanism and 
foundations of human nature. One's doxastic stability is attained thanks to the 
conflicting attraction and aversion that are caused by the pleasure instigated by the 
love oftruth and the uneasiness associated with sceptical melancholy. 
The sceptical crisis that Hume talks about in T 1.4.7.1-15 (SBN pp. 263-274) 
illustrates how the disappointment due to recognizing the limits of what he calls 
reason can plunge one into a deep sceptical melancholy. Yet, in spite of such a 
setback, one's passion for truth may not fade away. One can continue a philosophical 
project, albeit with the reservation that arises from the disappointing experiences of a 
sceptical melancholy crisis. Amusements and lively impressions allow one to 
temporarily stop questioning unjustified beliefs and acknowledge common 
concepts-such as space, time, existence, causation, reason, and persona} identity. 
Moreover, the portrayal of Hume's sceptical crisis does not entait that one must reject 
scepticism tout court. In fact, Hume's solution to sceptical melancholy is a moderate 
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kind of scepticism that shows that one can manage to strike a balance between the 
natural tendencies to assent common beliefs and the also natural urge to raise doubts 
about those same beliefs. 
It is the feelings of pain and pleasure that motivate the altemation of a point of view 
about certain basic beliefs, until stability is reached. For instance, the feelings of 
despondency and pain due to an unfulfilled quest for truth (T 1.4.7.1-2, SBN pp. 
263-264) are counterbalanced by either the prospect of losing the pleasurable feeling 
of curiosity if one decided to stop philosophizing altogether (T 1.4.7.12, SBN pp. 
270-271), or giving up the agreeable hope of contributing to the advancement of 
knowledge (T 1.4.7.14, SBN p. 273). The contrast between feelings of pain and 
pleasure illustrate the mechanism through which one's scepticism becomes mitigated. 
Hurne's solution to sceptical melancholy reveals that one cannot escape the 
uneasiness and pain of being in a state of uncertainty through more philosophizing, 
because it inevitably lead to more uncertainty. The remedy lies in moderating or 
temporarily interrupting intense thinking (T 1.4.7.9, SBN p. 269).63 He thinks that 
reason (as understood by Hume) alone is of no help in getting rid of the uneasiness 
caused by excessive and fruitless thinking. It is thanks to distractions, amusements, 
and the company of others that the sceptic philosopher escapes the trap that his own 
curiosity, and an excessive trust in rationality, has led him into. 
The following passage illustrates Hurne's belief in the impotence of moderating 
reason, for avoiding philosophical despondency: 
Those, who take a pleasure in declaiming against hurnan nature, have observ'd, 
that man is altogether insufficient to support himself; and that when you loosen 
ali the holds, which he has of externat objects, he immediate! y drops down into 
the deepest melancholy and despair. From this, say they, proceeds that 
63 T 1.4.7.9, SBN p. 269 is quoted in section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
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continuai search after amusement in gaming, in hunting, in business; by which 
we endeavour to forget ourselves, and excite our spirits from the languid state, 
into which they fall, when not sustain'd by sorne brisk and lively emotion. To 
this method of thinking 1 so far agree, that 1 own the mind to be insufficient, of 
itself, to its own entertainment, and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects, 
which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits. On the 
appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood 
flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a 
vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments. Hence 
company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, viz. 
a rational and thinking Being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the 
actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; 
and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions, which 
are caus' d by any object. Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of a 
passion, because such an idea becomes a kind of passion, and gives a more 
sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or conception (T 2.2.4.4, 
SBN pp. 352-353). 
In this quote, Hume points out the fragile state of mind of someone who neglects to 
pay attention to the lively impressions of extemal objects, which play a crucial part 
in holding beliefs. One can readily appreciate that the passions arising from the lively 
impressions produced by the company of others, are an agreeable cure to sceptical 
melancholy.64 By rejecting abstruse reasonings and engaging with others in society, 
the melancholic state of the contemplative philosopher dissipates. The uneasiness of 
sceptical melancholy recedes with the interruption of hard questioning and the 
engagement of one's attention in ordinary life. The mechanism portrayed by Hume to 
correct an excessive and damaging use of abstruse reasonings, which is expressed as 
a full-blown and hopeless scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1 of the Treatise, is to 
reject those difficult reasonings and regain belief by plunging back into normal 
activities and relations with others. 
64 There are other examples in Hume's work dealing with the altemation between beliefs, see for 
instance T 1.4.1.5, SBN p. 181; T 1.4.2.9, SBN p. 190; EHU 12.24-25. For brevity's sake, such 
additional examples are not discussed here. 
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The altemation between the sceptical views experienced during quiet philosophical 
reflection and the unquestioned acceptance of matters that seem evident in common 
life plays a crucial role in the development of moderate scepticism. The contrast 
between the memories of these experiences gives rise to a more balanced doxastic 
point of view, which is moderate scepticism. The contrast between the feelings 
caused by two extreme emotional standpoints-the pain and uneasiness of utter 
doubt, and the pleasure of innocent certainty associated with the beliefs that arise 
when engaging in society-illustrate how Hume's moderate scepticism is forged. 
Hume's solution echoes the prescribed remedies against melancholy in the eighteenth 
century, which have been explored in the previous chapter. For instance, in the 
conclusion of his Anatomy, Burton prescribes that, in order to maintain good health 
of body and soul, one must avoid "solitariness and idleness" (3.4.2.6). Such 
recommendation offers striking similarities with Hume's solution of avoiding 
philosophical melancholy by engaging m pleasant and amusing distractions, 
particularly in the company of others. 
In a similar way, Mandeville' s Treatise speaks of men of learning as 
"Hypochondriacal People" who are particularly prone to developing the "Disease of 
the Leamed" due to an excessive use of intellectual faculties and the neglect of their 
bodies ([ 1711] 1730, pp. 106-1 07). One can appreciate that the problem that 
Mandeville refers to stems from a lack of balance in human activities. Hume 
illustrates that one manages to avoid such imbalance by temporarily taking a step 
back from hard reasoning and engaging in diverting activities with others. 
Hume's solution reveals that one can avoid the melancholy caused by unanswered 
philosophical speculations concerning the existence and true nature of space, time, 
causation, reason, and persona! identity by plunging into the world outside the study 
room. Y et, once the sceptical cri sis has been overcome, things in the outside world 
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won't look exactly the same as before. A hint of scepticism conceming sorne basic 
beliefs may linger in the mind, thanks to the memory of the impressions lived 
through a sceptical crisis. 
For Hume, belief fixes an idea firmly in the imagination. That enlivened idea 
produces a minor kind of pleasure that prevents the discomfort associated with 
shifting objects of knowledge. A prominent feature of human nature, says Hume, is 
the disagreeableness associated with the experience of sudden and strong changes in 
objects. Doubt causes alterations in thought, abruptly transporting one's mind from 
one idea to another. This violent alteration induces pain and uneasiness. Moreover, 
the uneasiness due to the instability and inconstancy of an object is related to the 
degree of interest in that particular object. 65 
Hume's solution to sceptical melancholy is best understood when weighted against 
such uneasiness. The feelings of pain due to the doubt and instability regarding an 
object in which one is interested work as waming signs, telling one to momentarily 
step away from abstruse reasonings. In a similar way, the allure of the pleasurable 
feelings associated with the hope of attaining certainty and stability regarding an 
object of interest motivates further inquires. The upshot is that the contrast of the 
pleasurable attraction of certainty against the uneasiness occasioned by doubt 
moderates any excessive hopes of attaining the truth through rational inquiry. This 
way, the feelings of pain and pleasure modify the scope of one's commitment to 
common beliefs. 66 
65 This interpretation was directly inspired by Louis Loeb's work and it does not differ from his 
view (2002). 
66 Further evidence confirming Hume's portrayal of a balanced doxastic position can be found in 
the conclusion of Book II of his Treatise, which deals with curiosity, or the love of truth. In the 
closing paragraph of Book II (T 2.3.1 0.12, SBN pp. 453-454), Hume expounds the pleasant 
advantages ofbeliefand the uneasiness caused by disbelief. 
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Having expounded Hume's solution to sceptical melancholy, and before moving to 
the next section, which highlights the virtue of moderate scepticism, it is important to 
clarify certain aspects of what has been said so far. 
2.3.1 Hume's solution and his deterministic standpoint 
Given Hume's theory of the will, the interpretation 1 am offering might seem to be 
challenged. On the one hand, my interpretation of Hume's solution to sceptical 
melancholy underscores the prescription of temporarily rejecting abstruse 
reasonings; on the other hand, Hume's deterministic theory suggests that human 
actions are always determined by antecedent motivations and are, therefore, not 
under the agent's control (T 2.3.1.5, SBN p. 401). Thus, Hume prescriptive attitude is 
undermined by his deterministic conception of the will. 
Hume uses the word "ought" numerous times throughout his Treatise67 and suggests 
that one can choose a course of action when he says that "[w]here reason is lively, 
and mixes itself with sorne propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, 
it never can have any title to operate upon us" (T 1.4.7.11, SBN p. 270) or that "[i]n 
ali the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe, that 
tire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to think 
otherwise" (T 1.4.7.11, SBN p. 270). These recommendations have a normative 
salience, which is apparent in Hume' s use of the modal "ought". This suggest, as in 
the case of any normative prescription, that one is not forced or determined to act 
according to it since it is possible to recognize the normative force of a prescription 
while resist acting according to it. The apparent contradiction between Hume's 
67 The word "ought," which suggests taking certain course of action, is used 58 times throughout 
Hume's Treatise. This fact reveals the importance that Hume gives to normative sentences, an 
apparently strange thing to do for someone, Iike Hume, who also endorses a deterministic theory. 
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determinism about action and the quasi-normative prescription expressed in 
recommendations like the "Title Principle"68 needs to be solved if one is to daim that 
Hume off ers a solution to sceptical melancholy. 
It seems awkward to say that Hume is prescribing a solution against melancholy 
when one is already determined to avoid sceptical melancholy due to causes beyond 
one's control, that is, by nature. 69 It seems that avoiding the pain and uneasiness that 
arise due to an excessive use of rationality would save the philosopher from sceptical 
melancholy regardless of Hume's solution. 
Perhaps looking at Hume's stance on what he calls "liberty and necessity," can help 
to elucidate this point. Hume compares the question of whether human actions are 
indifferent to influence-as opposed to determined by antecedent causes-to the 
question of whether there is a necessity governing the operation of externat bodies (T 
2.3.1.1-2.3.4.10, SBN pp. 399-422). For Hume, one is unable to penetrate into the 
force, or causal connection, governing both the events of human beings and of 
externat bodies. At best, one is only able to imagine a more or less predictable 
outcome governing these events by observing their constant conjunction and 
generating an association-through the habit of observing such constant 
conjunction--of the cause and effect involved in such events and inferring a 
necessity in one's mind. 
According to Hume's observations about the will and human events, it is consistent 
to say that there is no certainty regarding whether one can willingly regulate the love 
of truth. The only plausible explanation-the one offered by Hume-is that only 
68 Cf. section 2.1.2 of this thesis, where Don Garret's interpretation of the "Title Princip le" is 
explained. 
69 By the terrn nature 1 mean the innate or essential qualities of the mind that produce belief due to 
lively impressions. See note 37 of this thesis. 
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another passion, such as the pain and uneasiness caused by sceptical melancholy, can 
counteract the love of truth. 
It seems strange that, for Hume, the altemation of sceptical doubts and the pursuit of 
activities that distract from these doubts seem to occur by a mechanism over which 
one has no control. It is not thanks to the will or what Hume caUs reason, but to a 
passion (e.g. sceptical melancholy), that the impulse and activity associated with 
another passion (e.g. the love of truth) is balanced. The balance resulting from the 
contrast between these conflicting passions has a crucial role in shaping Hume's 
moderate scepticism. 
But Hume's theory of the will is not actually a threat to my view. I believe that a 
compatibilist approach can solve this problem. Hume's deterministic standpoint does 
not exclude any recommendation to avoid melancholy and my interpretation of his 
solution to sceptical melancholy is compatible with his deterministic standpoint. To 
further explain this compatibilist approach it is important to look at how Hume 
understands the will, which, for him, is nothing but an impression: 
Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure, there is none more 
remarkable than the WILL; and tho', properly speaking, it be not 
comprehended among the passions, yet as the full understanding of its nature 
and properties, is necessary to the explanation of them, we shall here make it 
the subject of our enquiry. I desire it may be observ'd, that by the will, I mean 
nothing but the internai impression we fee/ and are conscious of when we 
knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our 
mind. This impression [ ... ] 'tis impossible to de fine, and needless to describe 
any farther; for which reason we shall eut off all those definitions and 
distinctions, with which philosophers are wont to perplex rather than clear up 
this question (T 2.3.1.2, SBN p. 399). 
In this passage, Hume is saying that the will is the impression of the feeling of acting 
or perceiving, and that one can only understand it by introspection-not by 
definition. Hume avoids any association between a voluntary faculty and what he 
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understands by the will. This is important because Hume's notion of the will does not 
entail that the will can be controlled, since the will is nothing more than an 
impression and one cannot control impressions. 
In relation to this, Hume also daims that if absolute freedom or "chance" existed, 
this would imply that human actions have no cause, they would be random and could 
not be ascribed to their author (T 2.3.2.6, SBN p. 410), which would be an obvious 
contradiction because there can't be effects without causes (T 2.3.1.18, SBN p. 407). 
Hume advocates a conception of liberty that equates it with the absence of any 
violent and physical obstruction to human acts, that is, freedom from constraint (T 
2.3.2.1, SBN p. 407). This is relevant because, for Hume, the freedom to act is 
nothing more than the absence of impediments to act and one cannot act without a 
cause. 
Keeping this in mind, it is reasonable to say that the cure prescribed by Hume is not 
incompatible with his theory of determinism. As long as one has freedom from 
constraint, getting to know Hume's solution may form part of the causes that 
motivate one to avoid sceptical melancholy. By providing a remedy, Hume is merely 
showing the way to those whose circumstances may impede them to see clearly that 
rejecting abstruse reasonings is the best solution to alleviate the symptoms of an 
unsatisfied love of truth. In coherence with his view of freedom and the will, Hume's 
solution to sceptical melancholy is nothing but another cause that may influence 
one's action. 
Hume's advice is offered for a good reason: If one is to avoid sceptical melancholy, 
one ought to reject abstruse reasonings. Of course, this remedy may happen by itself: 
the pain and uneasiness that arise due to an excessive use of rationality may force 
one to stop this behaviour. But following Hume's remedy could also influence the 
behaviour of the stubbom thinker be fore the pain and uneasiness that arise due to an 
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excessive use of rationality causes her to act. In any case, Hume's theory of liberty 
and necessity shows that, if she is to be cured, no constraints must impede the 
stubborn philosopher from stopping abstruse reasoning. 
Although I am unable to prove that one can decide to follow Hume's remedy, I have 
shown that Hume's deterministic standpoint is compatible with my interpretation of 
his solution to sceptical melancholy and that one may reject abstruse reasonings by 
following his recommendation before the pain and uneasiness that arise due to an 
excessive use ofrationality forces one to stop this behaviour. 
That being said, a further clarification needs to be given. I interpret that one becomes 
a moderate sceptic thanks to the combination of appropriate natural character traits 
such as inquisitiveness, attentiveness, ambition, curiosity 70-which are conducive to 
developing the passion of curiosity or the love of truth-as weil as the appropriate 
externat circumstances, such as having the appropriate resources to develop one's 
endeavours, not being constrained by superstitious authorities, etc. In other words, I 
interpret that one's love of truth and the appropriate externat circumstance are the 
elements that allow one to become a moderate sceptic. This seems to lead to the 
conclusion that any prescription to become a moderate sceptic would have no effect 
without the appropriate character traits and circumstances. Such conclusion is 
inaccurate. 
Although the appropriate character traits and circumstances are necessary elements 
in becoming a moderate sceptic, a prescription to temporarily avoid abstruse 
reasonings can contribute to becoming a moderate sceptic-if this prescription is 
followed. Knowledge of such prescription would be nothing more than another 
70 These character traits are inherent to their possessor and cannot be leamed, acquired, or 
controlled. They develop through their use, given the appropriate environmental circumstances. See 
section 2.2.1 of this thesis. 
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element in the mix of circumstances contributing to the development of the moderate 
sceptic. 
Before concluding section 2.3 of this thesis, another crucial aspect of my 
interpretation needs to be clarified. It concems the different outcomes that the love of 
truth can cause and that diverge from the path that I've described. 
2.3.2 Other possible outcomes motivated by the love oftruth 
In a nutshell, my interpretation starts with a person who possesses the right mix of 
character traits (such as attentiveness, ambition, curiosity, and inquisitiveness), while 
living under the appropriate circumstances (such as a community where knowledge 
is valued and where there are no physical or moral constraints to search the truth). 
Now, her character traits may develop in different directions. She might be 
interested, for instance, in questions regarding how the universe works. But if this 
person's use of reason is motivated by the desire for solving fundamental questions 
conceming certain ideas-such as space, time, existence of extemal objects, 
causation, immaterial substances, reason, and personal identity-then she will 
eventually be confronted with sceptical arguments.71 
Now, depending on the kind of mix of her character traits and circumstances, this 
person may deal with sceptical arguments in different ways. For instance, he may 
become a radical sceptic, such as Pyrrho, and become comfortable with not finding a 
solution to sceptical riddles-provided the liveability problem is solved. 72 On the 
other hand, a slightly different person-someone with a stronger curiosity-may not 
71 Cf. section 2.1.1 ofthis thesis. 
72 Cf. note Il of this thesis. 
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accept an unsatisfied love of truth and pursue further investigations. These 
investigations may lead her into the dilemma of having to choose between "a false 
reason and none at all" (T 1.4.7.7, SBN p. 268).73 This dilemma will plunge this 
person into a loss of hope attaining the truth, which could tum into a full-blown 
sceptical crisis. 
The pain and uneasiness of the melancholy triggered by an unsatisfied love of truth 
will act as waming signs that this is not the right path to follow. Now, the pain and 
uneasiness that arise due to an excessive use of rationality may cause this person to 
stop indulging in abstruse reasoning and shift her attention towards distractions, 
company, and lively impressions. Altematively, this person may find a solution to 
sceptical melancholy thanks to the advice found in the works of sorne of the 
intellectuals who have written about this problem, such as Hume or the medical 
scholars who prescribed remedies against the "Disease of the Leamed" in the 
eighteenth century. 74 
A person lacking the symptoms of uneasiness and pain due to an unsatisfied love of 
truth might be perfectly satisfied with her situation and avoid any philosophical 
inquiries. Hume acknowledges that this is an acceptable stance. He even praises the 
attitude of the person who lives her life without any further inquiries into 
fundamental questions: 
1 am sensible [ ... ] that there are in Eng/and, in particular, many honest 
gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing 
themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little 
beyond those objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses. And indeed, 
of such as these 1 pretend not to make philosophers, nor do 1 expect them either 
to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries. They do 
73 Cf. section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
74 Cf. section 1.3 of this thesis. 
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well to keep themselves in their present situation (T 1.4.7.14, SBN pp. 272-
273). 
But a person who possesses the character traits of attentiveness, ambition, curiosity, 
and inquisitiveness, and who lives under the appropriate circumstances, will be 
motivated to satisfy her passion. This is where the distinction between different 
circumstances is crucial in determining the kind of outcome appropriate to the one 
who loves truth. For instance, sorne historical or cultural circumstances may channel 
a person's curiosity towards religious or superstitious investigations. A good 
historical example of this kind of person would be a member of the Dominican Order 
whose character traits and living circumstances motivate him to devote his 
intelligence to understanding the truths of the Church. A person with the same 
passion for knowledge, but under different historical or cultural circumstances, may 
channel her passion for knowledge towards the generally harmless and modest 
speculations of philosophy (T 1.4.7.13, SBN pp. 271-272).75 It is the latter kind of 
person who will benefit the most from Hume's solution to sceptical melancholy. This 
person will not reach doxastic stability by completely rejecting abstruse reasonings. 
Instead, moved by her character traits and circumstances, she will allow herself a 
retum to refined philosophical speculations on topics that naturally attract her 
interest. 76 Reaching doxastic balance, the latter kind of person will be able to face the 
limits of reason while avoiding the dilemma of having to choose between "a false 
reason and none at all." 
After accounting for the problems of determinism and alternative outcomes to 
curiosity, 1 will conclude my interpretation of Hume's solution to sceptical 
75 Full citation below, cf. section 2.4.1 of this thesis. 
76 Cf. section 2.1.2 of this thesis, where Don Garret's interpretation of the "Title Princip le" is 
explained. 
79 
melancholy with a discussion of the moral advantages of moderate scepticism, and 
the role that virtuous character traits have therein. 
2.4 Virtue and moderate scepticism 
I hereby suggest that, by Hume's own standards, a moderate sceptic can be 
considered a virtuous person-that is, a person with virtuous character traits.77 If 
true, this claim reinforces my reading of Hume's scepticism in the Treatise by 
showing that moderate scepticism can have a place not only in Hume's theory of 
knowledge and his explanation of the passions, but also in his moral theory. 
Moderate scepticism can be understood as fostering two separate but complementary 
forms of virtue: Epistemic and practical. First, the moderate sceptic is cautious about 
committing to "dogmatic" beliefs. The usefulness of this aspect ofher scepticism lies 
in the avoidance of error and deception. Second, moderate scepticism helps in 
avoiding sceptical melancholy, which may hinder a good life. In order to elaborate 
these two claims, I will first briefly explain what Hume means by virtue and the role 
that he gives to sympathy in his account. 
For Hume the power of sympathy lies m the communication of affections and 
sentiments between persons (T 3.3.1.7, SBN pp. 575-576). It can be explained thanks 
to the similarity in nature and operation of minds, which are susceptible to 
communicate emotions through different forms of expression. Hume offers the 
example of one person observing the effects of a passion in the voice and gesture of 
77 In this respect, a link could also be established between Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, 
expounded in the Nichomachean Ethics (1106a25-1109b25), as characterisation ofvirtue, and Hume's 
doxastic moderation. A further development of such link may point towards a "virtue ethics" reading 
of Hume's moral theory in the Treatise. See, for instance, the work of Slote (2001). This tine of 
research may be worth exploring in a different project. 
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another. The observer associates these effects with their causes, forming such a lively 
idea that he experiences the passion himself. Although the observer has no direct 
access to another person's passions, he is aware of their effects or causes since he can 
note the same effects in association with his own passion. The result of this process, 
says Hume, is the inference that one person makes about the passion of another (T 
3.3.1.6-7, SBN pp. 575-576). 
Examining moral sentiments, Hume daims that approval (or condemnation) of 
mental qualities can happen in four different ways. The virtuous mental qualities are 
noticed, from a common point of view, to be either: 1) useful to other observers, 2) 
useful to their possessor, 3) immediately agreeable 78 to other observers, or 4) 
immediately agreeable to their possessor (T 3.3.1.28-30, SBN pp. 590-591 ). 
The principle of sympathy allows one person to approve or disapprove the mental 
qualities and sentiments of others, even if remotely related. This principle is crucial 
to understanding virtue and vice because it allows the observer to make inferences 
about the mental qualities of others. Hume offers the example of the approbation of 
the mental quality of someone who is generous in her narrow circle, while the 
observer, who does not belong to that circle, is therefore not directly benefited by her 
generosity. Sympathy allows the observer to share the pleasure of those benefited by 
the mental quality of the generous person, th us morally approving her (T 3.3 .3 .2, 
SBN pp. 602-603). 
For Hume, virtues are relatively stable and durable mental qualities (character traits, 
dispositions or intentions), which produce the sentiment ofpleasure or approbation in 
the form of love (of others) or pride (of self). In the same way, vices are those 
78 That is, a mental quality directly perceived as agreeable without any further retlection about its 
potential usefulness. 
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relatively stable qualities of mind that produce the sentiment of pain or 
disapprobation in the form of hatred (of others) or humility (of self). 
In addition, Hume distinguishes between artificial and natural virtues. Artificial 
virtues are those that are constituted as human conventions-that is, they are not 
natural and intrinsic characteristics of human nature. Artificial virtues have been 
developed over time to accommodate contingent circumstance of living in large and 
complex societies. Artificial virtues may provoke sentiments of moral approval, but 
not all the time, since sometimes the actions motivated by these virtues may seem to 
be contrary to the individual or public good. Examples of artificial virtues are justice, 
promise-keeping, allegiance, and modesty (T 3.2, SBN pp. 477-573). 
On the other hand, natural virtues stem from, and are inherent to, human nature. 
They have always motivated human behaviour, regardless of the living 
circumstances of its possessor. Natural virtues always produce, through sympathy, 
moral approval when observed to produce human action. Examples of natural virtues 
are generosity, friendship, and compassion (T 3.3, SBN pp. 574-621). 
Keeping this distinction in mind, 1 claim that moderate scepticism results from the 
combination between the appropriate mix of character traits-which Hume would 
call natural virtues-and the right circumstances. Mental qualities, such as 
attentiveness, ambition, and inquisitiveness that develop under the appropriate 
circumstances, motivate their possessor to love and seek the truth. Although these 
character traits may be considered virtuous separately, it is the proper combination of 
them that is of particular interest. The right combination of mental qualities 
possessed by the moderate sceptic is judged as virtuous because it is, factually, or 
potentially, useful toits possessor, or others, in her narrow circle. 
Now that Hume's conception of virtue has been accounted for, 1 will expound on the 
epistemic and practical virtues of modera te scepticism. 
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2.4.1 Moderate scepticism as epistemic virtue 
According to Hume, rejecting abstruse reasonings (by distractions, the company of 
others, and lively impressions) effectively saves the sceptic philosopher from 
melancholy. But the pain and uneasiness caused by doubt are not trifling 
experiences. These feelings form an integral part the mechanism through which the 
character of the moderate sceptic is shaped. Hume shows that moderate scepticism is 
the outcome of balancing an immoderate passion for truth. Moderate scepticism is 
useful or agreeable to its possessor and it can also be useful or agreeable to others 
surrounding him. 1 daim that moderate scepticism is motivated by virtuous character 
traits, such as attentiveness, ambition, curiosity, and inquisitiveness that develop 
under the appropriate circumstances. 
To start, one may look at a passage, from the conclusion of Book 1 of Hume's 
Treatise, which emphasizes the useful and agreeable benefits inherent in analyzing 
and questioning the validity of beliefs through a moderate philosophical approach: 
'Tis certain, that superstition is much more bold in its systems and hypotheses 
than philosophy; and white the latter contents itself with assigning new causes 
and principles to the phaenomena, which appear in the visible world, the 
former opens a world of its own, and presents us with scenes, and beings, and 
objects, which are altogether new. Since therefore 'tis almost impossible for 
the mind of man to rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of objects, 
which are the subject of daily conversation and action, we ought only to 
deliberate concerning the choice of our guide, and ought to prefer that which is 
safest and most agreeable. And in this respect 1 make bold to recommend 
philosophy, and shaH not scruple to give it the preference to superstition of 
every kind or denomination. For as superstition arises naturally and easily from 
the popular opinions of mankind, it seizes more strongly on the mind, and is 
often able to disturb us in the conduct of our lives and actions. Philosophy on 
the contrary, if just, can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments; 
and if false and extravagant, its opinions are merely the objects of a cold and 
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general speculation, and seldom go so far as to interrupt the course of our 
natural propensities (T 1.4.7.13, SBN pp. 271-272). 
In this passage, one can appreciate Hume's warmng against the widespread and 
immodest tendency of humans to speculate beyond measure, invent myths and 
hypotheses beyond available evidence and common life, and hold superstitious 
beliefs. Against the allure of an excessive use of the imagination in elaborating 
unwarranted beliefs, Hume praises the "mild and moderate sentiments" of 
philosophy. Choosing such an approach pro v es to safeguard one against the 
dangerous extremes of superstition and wild fantasy. 
In line with this passage, moderate scepticism can and does have a positive effect in 
one's life. At first, feeling the force of sceptical arguments may cause disagreeable 
effects, such as the melancholy crisis experienced by Hume by the end of Book I of 
the Treatise. Yet, eventually, these same arguments may help foster more reliable 
beliefs. 79 In turn, more reliable beliefs become a sign of possessing the appropriate 
mental qualities, which may be either useful to other observers, or their possessor or 
immediately agreeable to other observers, or their possessor. 
In line with this argument, Lome Falkenstein (1997) notes that, for Hume, someone 
who has once been convinced of the force of sceptical arguments will have an 
important advantage over someone who hasn't. She will be compelled to accept only 
"statistically guided causal inferences m preference to the dictates of 
'unphilosophical' belief-forming mechanisms" (pp. 60-61 ). 80 
79 By more "reliable" beliefs I mean those beliefs that have passed the test of a moderate sceptical 
scrutiny. 
80 In relation to the concept of "statistically guided causal inference," Falkenstein (1997) exp lains 
that "Hume takes it that most of our causal inferences are more deliberate and result from our 
consciously counting up confirming and contrary instances, subtracting the latter from the former, and 
considering the belief in the causal connection to fall as far short of certainty as the remainder 
resulting from the subtraction falls short of the original oum ber of confirming experiments. In this 
~------------------------------------------------
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Falkenstein agrees that a sceptical crisis can have a positive and desirable outcome, 
in spite of being initially disagreeable. Those who have felt a sceptical crisis and 
have been convinced of sceptical arguments will have a much higher standard for 
accepting beliefs. 81 Put another way, not only can sorne persons temporarily live 
without beliefs (i.e. while feeling a sceptical crisis or while questioning, from time to 
time, their beliefs ), but, the temporary suspension of beliefs can and does have a 
positive and exploratory function for those with the aforesaid naturally virtuous 
character traits. 
Naturally virtuous character traits such as attentiveness, ambition, and 
inquisitiveness motivate their possessor to love and seek the truth. But, while seeking 
the truth, their possessor may feel the force of sceptical arguments, causing pain and 
uneasiness. This discomfort will make the inquirer temporarily stop the research. The 
combination of these character traits offers a clear epistemic advantage for their 
possessor. According to Hume's own standard, these character traits-in the right 
combination and under the appropriate circumstances-are to be judged as virtuous. 
A person possessing the above-mentioned character traits, who conducts her 
inquiries with moderate scepticism, will have an advantage over another person 
lacking such character traits and whose approach to knowledge lacks scepticism. The 
character traits that foster moderate scepticism are valued morally since, judging 
case, we deliberately proportion our belief in accord with the results of a calculation, rather than in 
accord with the felt vivacity of the idea" (p. 36). For Falkenstein ( 1997), an " 'unphilosophical' belief 
is indicative of a mind that has not engaged in the kind of retlection that curiosity and a proper respect 
for the truth demand, and hence of a possible tlaw in character " (p. 54). 
81 Such persons will limit their beliefs to their immediate impressions and to beliefs that fall within 
what Falkenstein (1997) calls " 'second' general rules, such as the rules that causes can never fait of 
their effects, that the probability of causes is to be judged by statistically sound studies and not by 
passion and recent anecdotes, and that generalizations are to be drawn on the efficacious features of 
causes and not their accidentai properties. Those who have not done these things, the vulgar, sitting in 
donut shops and reading tabloïd newspapers, will be superstitious, gullible and prejudiced, though 
they will consider their credulity to be nothing other than 'common sense ' " (p. 59). 
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from a common point of view, they tum out to be either useful or immediately 
agreeable to the person possessing them orto others surrounding her. 
The advantageous effects of possessing these natural virtues can be enjoyed 
throughout a lifetime. Indeed, Hume is aware of the significance of moderate 
scepticism throughout one's life. The following passage is key textual evidence: 
In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we 
believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too 
much pains to think otherwise. Nay if we are philosophers, it ought only to be 
upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the 
employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself 
with sorne propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can 
have any title to operate upon us (T 1.4.7.11, SBN p. 270). 
Hume is affirming his moderate scepticism by telling the reader not to force the use 
of what he calls reason in cases where its use may seem awkward and inappropriate, 
but only in cases in which one feels naturally inclined to do so. The passage shows 
that assuming common life beliefs can be appropriate when lively impressions 
compel one to accept them. But regardless of one's temporary acceptance of 
unwarranted beliefs, one may continue to question basic beliefs under the appropriate 
circumstances-that is, when naturally inclined to apply sceptical arguments. Such a 
passage is reminiscent of the moderate approach that Hume takes towards his 
excessive studies in order to remedy the uneasiness caused by his immoderate 
intellectual efforts. 82 
Moreover, the acceptance of beliefs is not solely based on what Hume understands 
by reason, but on the practical issue of avoiding subject matters beyond common life 
that involve metaphysical or dogmatic speculations. These kinds of beliefs can be 
dangerous and disagreeable to the person holding them orthose near her (T 1.4.7.13, 
82 Cf. section 1.1 of this thesis. 
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SBN p. 271). Sorne of the moderate sceptic's character traits will prompt her to only 
accept beliefs that pass the sceptical test, as opposed to beliefs involving myths, 
superstition, fallacious reasoning, and dogmatic daims. 1 daim that the appropriate 
combination of virtuous character traits predispose its possessor towards a 
moderately sceptical attitude that may help her avoid problematic beliefs. 
Now, someone may note that moderate scepticism only solves a self-induced 
problem-sceptical melancholy-leaving common-life problems untouched. If that 
is so, what is the advantage a moderate sceptic has over those not facing sceptical 
crises? 
lt is important to darify that natural virtues conducive to a moderately sceptical 
attitude are not necessary for avoiding questionable beliefs. In fact, one could avoid 
holding beliefs involving myths, superstition, fallacious reasoning, and dogmatic 
daims either by chance or through appropriate education-particularly the education 
received during the most crucial stages of one's development, which is chosen by 
one's caregivers. However, the content of the appropriate education will ultimately 
originate from a person motivated by the possession of the aforementioned virtuous 
character traits 83 (or sorne other similar character traits conducive to moderate 
scepticism). 
The only sure way to avoid dogmatic beliefs in society is to be guided by those 
persons who have developed, under the appropriate circumstances, the right 
combination of character traits. Such persons will have questioned beliefs that most 
people take for granted but-due to the pain and uneasiness that arise from an 
excessive use of rationality or thanks to the advice of intellectuals showing how to 
avoid sceptical melancholy-will not get carried away by an uncontrolled passion to 
know the truth. In this context, the right combination of character traits, developed 
83 This idea was inspired white reading the conclusion ofFalkenstein's (1997) article. 
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under the appropriate circumstances, is judged as virtuous, not only for being 
immediately agreeable and useful toits possessor, but also to others. 
For instance, Hume is aware of the positive moral judgement that is made about 
persons who contribute to the advancement of humanity. The following quo te from 
the conclusion of Book III of Hume's Treatise serves as evidence of Hume's 
awareness of others' moral recognition: 
Who indeed does not feel an accession of alacrity in his pursuits of knowledge 
and ability of every kind, when he considers, that besides the advantage, which 
immediately result from these acquisitions, they also give him a new lustre in 
the eyes of mankind, and are universally attended with esteem and 
approbation? (T 3.3.6.6, SBN p. 617). 
In this passage, Hume illustrates the usefulness and immediate agreeableness of 
virtuous character traits to both their possessor and to others. But, the passage also 
serves as evidence that Hume hopes that moral recognition could be granted to the 
philosopher whose pursuit ofknowledge contributes to humanity. The positive mood 
in this passage offers a direct contrast to the straightforward pessimism expressed in 
the conclusion of Book 1. 
In this section I have offered arguments and evidence to show that moderate 
scepticism is epistemically virtuous. In the following section I elaborate on its 
practical usefulness. 
2.4.2 Moderate scepticism as practical virtue 
In the Treatise, Hume portrays the practical virtue of moderate scepticism through a 
four-step process. First, the love of truth may drive a person into intense thinking and 
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deep speculation about common life beliefs. Second, this person may face a dilemma 
having to choose between two unreliable methods of inquiry (the faculty to make 
"demonstrative and probable reasonings" and an unrestrained imagination). This 
leads the person towards sceptical melancholy because both the imagination and 
what Hume calls reason alone prove insufficient to dispel the doubts that arise 
through sceptical arguments. This frustration plunges the person into deep despair 
and suffering. Third, the avoidance of despondency takes place by rejecting abstruse 
reasonings--diverting one's attention to non-intellectual matters and common life 
affairs. As the philosophical despair goes away, things seem to be back to normal. 
Fourth, curiosity and a passion for truth may drive this person back into 
philosophical speculation. But, after having already lived through the process of 
sceptical melancholy, this person has leamed that a modera te approach to knowledge 
allows one to question dogmatic beliefs without falling into a state of utter 
despondency. 
For a lover of truth, a life of moderate scepticism presents useful and immediately 
agreeable advantages compared to a life without any form of scepticism. The 
appropriate combination of character traits-such as attentiveness, ambition, and 
inquisitiveness, developed under the appropriate circumstances-and which is 
conducive to a life of moderate scepticism, is valued as practically virtuous from the 
common point of view because of the advantages that such character traits offer to 
both its possessors and to others close to her. The emphasis here is on the advantages 
that moderate scepticism can offer in living better. An excessive love of truth may 
burden its possessor with sceptical melancholy, and that sort of life can be hard to 
live if such passion remains unhalted. Hume's remedy-temporarily rejecting 
abstruse reasonings-proves to be a useful solution to avoid the pits of uncertainty 
that may hinder a good life. 
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Although most people doubt, now and then, about particular things, few undergo 
such a thorough sceptical crisis as the one portrayed by the end of Book I of the 
Treatise. Moderate scepticism proves to be useful and immediately agreeable for 
those whose love of truth puts them into a state of doubt-induced despondency. In 
this respect, moderate scepticism is a sign of possessing a combination of character 
traits that promote practical virtue. Hume's doxastic stability is revealed as a delicate 
balancing act between questioning one's beliefs through a disciplined use of abstruse 
reasonings and, when such questioning becomes fruitless and painful, taking a step 
back and moderating one's passion for truth through a practical engagement in 
common life. 
This dialectic is the characteristic pattern of the moderate sceptic's interaction with 
the world. Moreover, it is through such a balancing act that the moderate sceptic 
becomes a better person and is able to contribute to the quality of life of others. 
These benefits are produced when the lover of truth has learnt how to live without 
distress, even when her doubts remain unanswered. 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have explained how Hume conceives and solves the problem of 
sceptical melancholy. I have shown that Hume proposes the temporary avoidance of 
abstruse philosophical reasonings and favours the moderate scepticism that results 
therefrom. 
Hume shows that one can be initially motivated by an excessive passion to know the 
truth. But a strong hope in the promises of reason is quickly shattered by excessive 
doubt conceming the justification of certain beliefs. These excessive doubts trigger a 
profound cri sis of sceptical melancholy, which is explained by an unsatisfied love of 
truth. The emotional pain of sceptical melancholy makes one feel uneasy. Such 
discomfort provides a motivation for avoiding excessive doubt and thinking, pulling 
one, at the same time, to seek the lively impressions of common life and company. 
The eventual moderation of excessive doubt, achieved through distractions and the 
company of others, alleviates the pain of one's sceptical melancholy. 
However, the love of truth eventually brings one back to a dubitative state. This time, 
however, one's doxastic standpoint is more moderate. One is less committed to and 
disturbed by doubts, due to having already experienced that sceptical melancholy can 
be overcome. Altematively, if one is to temporarily abandon the love of truth and go 
back to the pleasures offered by distractions and the company of others, one will 
keep the faint memory of philosophical doubts, lessening-if only marginally---one's 
commitment to common life beliefs. The altemation caused by the love of truth and 
sceptical melancholy play a fundamental role in the formation of one's doxastic 
stability. Hume shows that these two conflicting passions can have a positive role in 
one's research project. 
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This interpretation shows important parallels between Hume's solution and the 
remedies prescribed against melancholy by eighteenth-century scholars. Although 
Hume writes extensive! y about the love of truth (T 2.3 .1 0.1-12, SBN pp. 448-454 ), 
he dedicates few passages to describing melancholy as a passion. A closer look at 
England's eighteenth-century conception of melancholy has been helpful in 
understanding this passion, which is constitutional of Hume's sceptical attitude. 
Moreover, the historical continuity and discrepancies of theories and treatments of 
melancholy, from its ancient Greek origins until Hume's time, are useful in enriching 
the perspective ofthe eighteenth century conception of this disease. 
In the first chapter of this thesis 1 showed that, in spi te of important advancements in 
medicine, these remedies remain prevalent in the eighteenth century. The findings of 
such exploration show that the solution depicted by Hume in order to escape a state 
of despondency is not new. Indeed, remedies consisting of distractions, the pleasant 
company of others, and moderation in studies are constitutive of both Hume's 
solution and the traditional conception and remedies against melancholy in 
eighteenth-century England. The way in which melancholy is treated in the 
eighteenth century illuminates how Hume suggests avoiding sceptical melancholy: 
By temporarily rejecting abstruse reasonings. 
1 have also shown that living through, and overcoming, a sceptical crisis presents 
important practical and epistemic advantages. One emerges from such crisis with a 
keener sense of one's limitations in grasping the truth and thereafter avoids making, 
or accepting, dogmatic (i.e. unwarranted) claims about how things really are. After 
living through a sceptical crisis, one becomes a bit less naïve when confronted with 
the compelling circumstances in which nature forces one to hold beliefs. The 
doxastic equilibrium-reached through the contrast of the episodes of sceptical 
melancholy lived in the study room and the pragmatism lived in common life-gives 
the moderate sceptic an advantage over the dogmatist. Such an advantage makes the 
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moderate sceptic a more virtuous person, at least regarding her approach towards 
knowledge. As Donald Livingston (1998) succinctly puts it: "One result of 
skepticism is to shape the moral character of the true philosopher" (p. 14 7). And, by 
shaping the "moral character," 1 understand the development of a virtuous disposition 
towards objects of knowledge. After overcoming a lack of certainty and confidence 
in the foundation of basic beliefs, the moderate sceptic will have attained a level of 
moderate caution in regards to the use of reason. 
Finally, my approach is significant because it offers an innovative understanding of 
the nature and scope of Hume's scepticism, which is a hotly debated topic. The 
evidence and arguments offered in this thesis support the view that Hume's 
scepticism is of a moderate nature. My position is in conflict with that of other 
schools of interpretation about Hume's scepticism, such as those who claim that 
Hume uses sceptical arguments to foster a naturalistic project or what he calls a 
"science of human nature" (Baier, 1991; Garrett, 1997; Kemp Smith, 1905a, 1905b, 
1941; Stroud, 1981); those who portray Hume as a radical sceptic (Beattie, [1783] 
1970; Kant, [1783] 2004; Reid, [1764/1785/1788] 1983; Waxman, 2003); those who 
claim that Hume offers the only "consistent" form of Pyrrhonian scepticism (Popkin, 
1951) or who explore how Hume' s metaphysical principles and speculations are not 
inconsistent with his own scepticism (Baxter, 2008). In contrast, the results of my 
work reinforce the existing school of interpretation supporting the idea of Hume 
being a mitigated sceptic (Broughton, 2008; Castiglione, 2006; Fogelin, 1985, 2009; 
Meeker, 1998; Norton, 1982, 1994; Penelhum, 2003; Strawson, 1985). 
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